

**AIRCRAFT
ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION BOARD
REPORT**

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OF

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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
UNITED STATES AIR FORCES IN EUROPE

MEMORANDUM FOR CINCUSAFE
USCINCEUR
IN TURN

23 JUN 1994

FROM: Board President

SUBJECT: Supplement to Black Hawk Aircraft Accident Investigation Report
(27 May 1994)

1. On 20 June 94, USCINCEUR asked the Accident Investigation Board to contact individuals who had flown as AWACS Mission Crew Members in Operation Provide Comfort, prior to the 14 April 94 Black Hawk accident. The purpose was to get a sense of what other AWACS crews understood to be their responsibilities towards Black Hawk flights in the OPC TAOR, specifically to include identification Friend or Foe (IFF) and radio procedures.
2. On 21 June 94, sixteen individuals were interviewed (Atch 1): They consisted of 5 Mission Crew Commanders, 4 Senior Directors, and 7 Weapons Directors. They came from different units and represented a broad spectrum of AWACS experience, but emphasized experience.
 - a. The interviews did not identify any directives or formal guidance not previously referenced in the report.
 - b. Several witnesses indicated that Black Hawk operations were considered separate, or distinct from the OPC mission generally; but, all indicated Black Hawks should be provided some form of flight-following, if they called in.
 - c. The interviews indicated a variety of viewpoints regarding what should be done for flight-following Black Hawks. The degree of monitoring considered appropriate ranged from a lot to very little. Views regarding lost contact techniques for Black Hawks ranged from diligent, concerted efforts to locate the helicopters, to assuming they had landed and taking no further action.
 - d. All witnesses who described procedures for scope symbology if they lost contact with a helicopter in the TAOR said they would "suspend" or "park" the symbology, rather than deleting it. Two indicated they would drop the symbology if they assumed the helicopter had landed.
 - e. The interviews indicated a wide variety of techniques regarding how to make IFF checks, and which modes to check.
 - f. Most witnesses agreed that there was no requirement to check Mode I codes, and that there was a requirement to check Mode IV codes. Most agreed that if a controller noticed an incorrect Mode I code, he or she should notify the aircraft. They agreed that an aircraft should be notified if a Mode IV code was bad (sour).

g. Although a few witnesses indicated an awareness of a requirement for aircraft in the TAOR to be on some TAOR tactical frequency, most indicated Black Hawks were usually kept on the enroute frequency.


h. Three witnesses indicated that they were aware of Black Hawks operating in the TAOR without AWACS flight following, at times. Two indicated Black Hawks might still be in the TAOR when AWACS went off station and one said he was aware of times Black Hawks would be at Zakku when AWACS came on station. Most said they were not aware of Black Hawks being in the TAOR without AWACS.

i. The witnesses consistently noted difficulties maintaining radar, IFF and radio contact with the Black Hawks in the TAOR. They indicated that terrain and not receiving radio calls from the Black Hawks after they were in the TAOR were problems.

j. Many witnesses stated that time, and participation in other operations, had adversely affected their ability to recall matters accurately.

3. On 18 June 1994, the Board obtained a copy of a "Manning Description for Commander Military Coordination Center," date 11 April 1994 (Atch 1). The manning document includes the language, "Exercises tactical control of UH 60 Aviation Detachment at Diyarbakir, Turkey" (Atch 2). (This is not necessarily inconsistent with OPLAN 91-7 which gives the CFACC exercise of tactical control of aircraft in the TAOR, but could create or indicate confusion regarding overall TACON responsibilities). We contacted CTF C-1 to request copies of this document and any other manning descriptions for key positions. We were provided the copies at Attachment 2, by fax. The manning descriptions received from CTF C-1 for "Commander, Military Coordination Center" is unsigned, undated, and does not contain the language noted above. CTF C-1 confirmed that it is the only copy for this position in his files. He said that all of the documents he faxed are copies of the original documents which he gave to CTF C-3. The description for the "Commander, Combined Forces Air Component" includes the language, "Acts as the commander for multinational, multi-service air forces assigned to CTF, Operation PROVIDE COMFORT (underlining added).

4. Having reviewed the documents attached to this memorandum, my 27 May 1994 report "Statement of Opinion" remains unchanged.


JAMES G. ANDRUS
Major General, USAF
President, Accident Investigation Board

3 Attachments

1. Witness Testimony
2. Manning Description Received 18 June 94
3. Manning Descriptions Received 22 June 94

SUPPLEMENT

- 1. Witness Testimony**
- 2. Manning Description Received 18 June 94**
- 3. Manning Description Received 22 June 94**

WITNESS TESTIMONY
SUPPLEMENT #1

- A. Major Bobby R. Baker
- B. Captain Roger A. Brown
- C. 1Lt Frances M. Cardaci
- D. Major Raymond E. Charlesworth
- E. Captain Kathleen C. Christian
- F. Captain Jonathan E. Fair
- G. Major Daryl K. Fitzgerald
- H. Captain Charles D. Grahn
- I. Captain William J. Harper, Jr.
- J. Major Britt L. Justmann
- K. 1Lt Preston D. Kise
- L. Major Dominick B. Knight
- M. 1Lt Douglas O. Kugler
- N. Captain Gregor J. Leist
- O. Captain Ruben Rios
- P. Captain Robert J. Rysavy, II

**SUMMARIZED TESTIMONY
MAJOR BOBBY R. BAKER
964th AWACS
TINKER AFB, OK**

The interview was conducted by Major Aaron D. Byas at Ramstein Air Base, Germany, beginning at 1544 hours, 21 June 1994. A witness advisement of rights was given in accordance with AFR 110-14, and the witness was sworn. This was a telephonic interview. The Board members were located at Ramstein AB, Germany. The witness was located at Tinker AFB, Oklahoma, and was identified there by a judge advocate.

EXAMINATION

I am presently a mission crew commander. I was checked out fully mission ready in April 1993. I have previous AWACS experience as a weapons director or surveillance officer. I have flown in Operation PROVIDE COMFORT (OPC). The last time I flew a mission in OPC was in late September-early October of last year. I have had two tours in OPC. My first tour was in the summer of 1993. I don't remember the exact month. On both of those tours, I was a mission crew commander.

I was aware that there were Black Hawks on the base and that they flew missions into TAOR. Specifically, I knew nothing. I was not aware of any helicopter operations flying out of Diyarbakir. My understanding of the AWACS responsibility in the TAOR was that if they checked in with us for flight-follow, that we would provide flight-following to them, but only if they checked in with us. When they checked in with us, I would not be the one who would control them since I was a mission crew commander. That question is better directed to a senior director. In a specific instance, I am not specifically aware of the weapons section controlling a helicopter on one frequency and changing them to another frequency. But as a method of operations, that would not be unusual if we had the weapons controllers available to do that. If any aircraft checked up on a frequency other than designated for their use, normally the weapons controller would go ahead and find the aircraft on the scope by their IFF code and, most likely, depending on how busy the controllers are, might keep them on that frequency as a service to the aircraft or might push them to another frequency for flight-follow. If they were squawking the wrong IFF code, it would be normal for the controller to ask them to recycle their IFF at the right numbers.

It is our procedure to check Mode I on aircraft. We would interrogate Mode I on all aircraft operating in the TAOR. That is part of the weapons section procedure. If they were squawking the wrong Mode I, we would go out on the frequency on which we were flight-following them and ask them to recycle that mode and set the right digits in. Mode IVs are checked in the TAOR. They were checked on every one that I flew. The weapons controllers, under the direction of the senior director, would perform those checks.


BAKER

I do not remember a specific instance where Black Hawk Flights were in the TAOR before AWACS came on station. It seems like that's something that they would have done, but I would not be surprised if that were to occur. I am not specifically aware of any occasions when the AWACS went off station and the Eagle Flights remained in the TAOR. I do not call any restrictions to prevent AWACS from going off station if Black Hawks were still in the TAOR. The requirement for all aircraft to change to a TAOR frequency as they entered the TAOR would depend on the type of aircraft. Interceptors would be on a HAVE QUICK type frequency, whereas Wild Weasels might be on another, while tankers would operate on yet another discreet frequency. I was not aware of any requirement of that sort regarding the Black Hawks. If they were to check up, procedurally, we would maintain them on what we call the flight-follow frequency. The flight-follow frequency is the same as the enroute frequency. I am not aware of any requirement for all aircraft to use the same Mode I squawk in the TAOR.

I have nothing further to add.

(The standard witness caution was given and the witness had no questions. The interview was concluded at 1600 hours.)

I certify that the foregoing is a true and accurate summary of the testimony of **MAJOR BOBBY R. BAKER**, as given to the Aircraft Accident Investigation Board.



WILLIAM K. AT LEE, JR., Col, USAF
Legal Advisor

BAKER

**SUMMARIZED TESTIMONY
CAPTAIN ROGER A. BROWN
965TH AWACS
TINKER AFB, OK**

The interview was conducted by Major Aaron D. Byas at Ramstein Air Base, Germany, beginning at 1746 hours, 21 June 1994. A witness advisement of rights was given in accordance with AFR 110-14, and the witness was sworn. This was a telephonic interview. The Board members were located at Ramstein AB, Germany. The witness was located at Tinker AFB, Oklahoma, and was identified by a judge advocate.

EXAMINATION

I am Captain Roger A. Brown. My organization is the 965th AWACS, Tinker AFB, OK. My present duty assignment is Instructor Weapons Director, with an additional duty of working in the Tactics Office of the 965th AWACS. I have been a Weapons Director since I graduated from the controller school in 1987.

I have flown as part of an AWACS mission crew in Operation PROVIDE COMFORT (OPC). The first tour was in March 1993 for not quite a four-week tour. The most recent one was the end of November-beginning of December 93, for three and a half weeks. My mission crew position during the OPC tour was as a crew weapons director. I flew seven or eight missions on each tour.

The UH-60 Black Hawk helicopters, call sign Eagle Flight, missions in the northern no-fly zone of Iraq, were used for transporting people into and out of Iraq. The organizations they were transporting were investigating or checking up on the Kurds in Iraq. I didn't know who specifically was on the aircraft. I worked clearances into and out of country; and, when able, we would flight-follow them in-country and they would check up with us occasionally. As far as the Black Hawk itself, it's a standard Army transport helicopter.

I have had the opportunity to work as the TAOR controller and the enroute controller several times. Regarding performing any IFF checks on the helicopters during my duties as the enroute controller, the normal procedure for me would be when an aircraft would check up with me, if I had a fragged transponder code, I would look for that code. If I did not have a fragged code, I would have to ask them what their transponder would send. That's what we used to identify the aircraft flying in or out. If I could not find the appropriate code on the console and only had a radar return without a transponder, I could ask their position from a common reference point. If they could tell me where they were from a certain airfield, then I could see radar only. So we could do it either way.

If I knew it was a military aircraft and I was having a problem finding them, I would use Mode IV to aid me in finding that aircraft. For check-in controller, we always did a Mode IV

BROWN

check to make sure all aircraft had good squawk. If they didn't, we would notify them that we didn't have a good Mode IV. If we had a good one, we would not say anything. Normal procedures for us were to do a Mode IV check on all OPC aircraft. I don't remember if that was a required item for the helicopters. I did the checks, but I don't remember if that was a requirement. We had flights from the area near Diyarbakir into Iraq on a routine basis. I did not consider those helicopters as part of the OPC package. I considered them to be a separate entity. I did feel there was a requirement to conduct Mode IV checks on those helicopters. I did not do Mode I checks. I did not do Mode I checks on any OPC aircraft flying out of Incirlik. One of the features we have on our console gives us the ability to look for a certain Mode. I would set up whatever Mode I we had for that time period with a rotating Mode I so that it aided me in spotting, at one glance, all the OPC aircraft. It was an aid for me, but I did not check specifically each aircraft.

As far as being aware of requirements for any aircraft in the Tactical Area of Operations to have the same Mode I, I know that the Air Tasking Order did have a fraggged Mode I for each time period. It's a normal thing for everyone to have the Mode I on, but that was not part of my normal check. When I was there, I was not checking for the Mode I for the helicopters. When the Mode I's were due to rotate. I would make a time hack call on the radio to remind the pilots to roll their Mode I's to the new code. That was the extent of my involvement with Mode I's.

For any of the fighter aircraft in the TAOR, we made sure they changed over to the TAOR frequency once they entered the TAOR. The French tanker track was partially in Iraq so we kept them on a separate freq. Because we had their ground ops on our check-in frequency, normally, the helicopters would stay on the check-in frequency in the AOR. As far as where we drew the line between the two, I'm not sure exactly where that is. If a helicopter entered the TAOR, they would normally stay on the enroute frequency. Helicopter ground ops had that frequency as well, and they could call us, or the helicopters, on that frequency. We had the E-3, the helicopter ops at different bases and the helicopters all on one frequency, and it saved us from doing a lot of voice relay. It made good sense to us at the time, because we could talk to the ground ops and the ground could talk directly to the helicopter or we could talk directly to the helicopter.

As far as being aware at any time that the Eagle Flight was operating in the TAOR after we had departed the area, Eagle Flights would go into Iraq and we would leave station. To my knowledge they were still in there. Normally, we had to be on station if they wanted to exit or enter the country, but once they were in country, they could stay without us being airborne. As far as going on station with Eagle Flights operating inside the TAOR, I don't recall if they were on station. We had some take off from inside at Zakhu once we were on station; but as far as already airborne and operating, I don't recall that ever happening.

As far as the in-theater in-briefing or information I received toward AWACS responsibility

BROWN

toward the Eagle Flight on my last OPC tour, I do some of the training here. I'm trying to remember what we covered here and what we covered there. The Combined Task Force had a representative brief us on assets in-theater, and we were reminded that they were operating. When we did our weapons controller training, we reviewed procedures and went through frequencies and were told to flight-follow them. It wasn't an extensive training. It was more of a reminder that they were operating there, because our crew had been there before.

In my position as a TAOR controller, if I observed an incorrect Mode I which is something that would not normally stand out, I would just say call sign, check Mode I. If that did not correct the problem and I was able to go secure using a secure communications with that aircraft, I would tell them to reset their Mode I. On an unsecured radio, it would just be a check Mode I. If I noticed it, it would include any aircraft; but usually it was not something I would have noticed.

I do not recall noticing any great change between my two tours regarding the guidance about Eagle flight activities and AWACS responsibilities to them. It was standard procedure that they checked up and we would flight-follow them as long as we could and occasionally radio relay for them. In early December, we actually used one of the UH-60's for a search and rescue effort. We understood their mission and we knew where they were flying. They were near the Turkey-Iraq border.

Quite often we lost comm, radar, and IFF while we were flight-following. From Diyarbakir to Zakhu, we had fairly good radio and radar with the helicopters. As they left Zakhu going east into the mountains or south of the mountains, we frequently lost radio and radar with the helicopters. We had no set procedures in those circumstances. If we could track them, we would continue to track them. If we could not see the radar, occasionally I would make a lost-contact call. But if I couldn't see or hear them, I made the assumption they could not hear me either, so I'd just drop the symbology and wait for their radar return to appear on the console or hear their voice and reestablish contact. If I thought they were flying into a base to land, I would drop the symbology. If it was a portion of the AOR where I knew that, if I lost radar returns but that in 15 miles it would appear again, then I would suspend it until they appeared again. It was very dependent upon which way they were going and whether or not I felt I would be with them again soon or it would be a length of time.

If I knew their destination and had lost the ability to track them at a point prior to the known destination, there was not a set procedure to follow. As far as technique and what I would do, if I thought I would see them again before landing, I would attempt to dead-reckon and keep the symbology close. If I knew they were going to a place and I would not see their radar again, I would drop the symbology completely.

As far as flight-following helicopters, there is no set procedure for much of that. There is

BROWN

a lot of technique involved. The crew I was on had worked together quite a bit. We talked among ourselves. As far as the helicopters go, it was just an assumption that if we see them, we talk to them. If we couldn't see or talk to them, they were going to do their business whether we were there or not is the impression I was under.

After our crew arrived on each occasion, a member of the Combined Force staff briefed our crew. I do not recall the duty position of the person who did that. "Bags" was his nickname. I think he was a captain, an F-15 driver. I know he was on the Combined Task Force there at Incirlik, but I do not recall his duty position.

I have nothing further to add.

(The standard witness caution was given and the witness had no questions. The interview was concluded at 1808.)

I certify that the foregoing is a true and accurate summary of the testimony of **CAPTAIN ROGER A. BROWN**, as given to the Aircraft Accident Investigation Board.



WILLIAM K. AT LEE, JR., Col, USAF
Legal Advisor

BROWN

**SUMMARIZED TESTIMONY
1 LT FRANCES M. CARDACI
964TH AWACS
TINKER AFB, OK**

The interview was conducted by Major Aaron D. Byas at Ramstein Air Base, Germany, beginning at 2035 hours, 21 June 1994. A witness advisement of rights was given in accordance with AFR 110-14, and the witness was sworn. This was a telephonic interview. The Board members were located at Ramstein AB, Germany. The witness was located at Tinker AFB, Oklahoma, and was identified by a judge advocate.

EXAMINATION

I am First Lieutenant Frances M. Cardaci. My organization is the 964th AWACS, Tinker AFB, OK. My present duty assignment is Weapons Director. I became mission ready as a Weapons Director in April 1993.

I have flown as part of an AWACS mission crew in support of Operation PROVIDE COMFORT (OPC). My most recent tour was from 8 May to 7 June of 1994. Prior to that, it was mid-October to mid-November 1993.

(The witness was advised that her answers to the following questions should be based on her understanding regarding matters prior to 14 April 1994, and that all of the questions would relate to her actions and procedures known to her at that time. The witness stated that she understood and would not make any reference to matters which occurred or understandings created by her activity in the last tour.)

As far as the UH-60 Black Hawk helicopters, call sign Eagle Flight, mission in the northern no-fly zone of Iraq: during my first tour, I don't think we were ever actually briefed on what they do. We knew they would check up with us, go into the area, land at a predetermined location, and take off again after a period of time on the ground. As far as what exactly they did, we were never briefed on that. My understanding of the AWACS' responsibility to those helicopters was radio communication and flight-following. On my previous tour, as far as receiving any in-theater in-briefing or other information regarding AWACS' responsibilities toward the UH-60 helicopters, the only thing we were ever briefed on them was that they would make radio contact with us and then we would flight-follow them from their take-off point to landing, and their subsequent take-off back to their station. I received an in-briefing from the OPC staff. I don't recall any briefing during my first tour there.

During my first tour, I honestly don't remember any specifics regarding going on station and having Black Hawk helicopters already operating in the TAOR. It's probably a possibility, but I don't remember any specific missions when they were operating. I don't recall during any of my missions that the helicopters operated in the northern no-fly zone of Iraq and not talking to the

CARDACI

AWACS. I recall going off station and the helicopters still operating in the northern no-fly zone. We have departed the area and the helicopters were still performing their mission because once they land, we are not in radio contact with them anymore. If for some reason we had to leave the area for weather or some other circumstance, such as airplane malfunction or an in-flight emergency, we would have no way of telling them, directly, that we were departing the area.

During my first tour, the helicopters that were operating in the northern no-fly zone of Iraq stayed on enroute frequency exclusively. As far as a requirement for all aircraft to change to the TAOR frequency, all the other aircraft switched at a certain point, but the helicopters always maintained enroute freq. As far as whether it was part of our procedures to direct them or to have them maintain their frequency, it was the procedure that they stayed on enroute.

Regarding whether the Mode I squawk for the helicopters was the same inside the TAOR as it was outside the TAOR, the ATO publishes Mode I squawks for rotary and fixed aircraft inside and outside the AOR. As far as checking the Mode I of aircraft operating in the TAOR being part of our procedures, I know it is now. There wasn't as much emphasis on it then, but it is part of the procedure to check and make sure who you're talking to by whatever means. I know, as a practice, most people were content, that as long as they were squawking the correct Mode III, that's who you were talking to.

If I was aware of an aircraft squawking the incorrect Mode I in the TAOR, the procedure would be to notify them that they were squawking improperly. The terminology is usually "Recycle Parrot" or "Squawk as fragged". As far as IFF checks that were done routinely on helicopters as they entered the no-fly zone, the airplane had a capability to track on a LOCATE SIF. What it does is, when you load into the computer a certain squawk, and it doesn't necessarily have to be a Mode III or Mode I, you can locate or load a I, II, or III squawk and whenever the system detects that squawk, it will show on your display a particular letter that you load yourself. So usually for the Eagles, most people would put in an "E" and then their squawk. So as long as you saw the "E" on your display, you knew that's where he was. If he wasn't squawking properly, you wouldn't get the E. As far as what IFF checks, if any, were conducted on helicopters as they entered the TAOR, that's basically it. As long as you're getting that display, it is constantly being checked as the system cycles.


When they take off, you conduct a Mode IV check. This was on my previous tour. We did a Mode IV check on fighter aircraft. We did a Mode IV check on UH-60 aircraft as they took off. They ordinarily took off from Diyarbakir. We would do that normally when they checked up because the procedure is to do the checks and to give what we call a SWEET or SOUR call. Those are by exception. You normally only give a SOUR call and that would be telling them that their Mode IV was not good. You would have to check it each time in order to make that call. Generally, we did not do any other specific IFF checks on the Black Hawks when they would call in other than Mode IV. As long as you're getting a good locate SIF on them, you know that their Mode III is good and you do the Mode IV check to make sure that's good. It wasn't my habit. I can't speak for other controllers, but it wasn't my habit to routinely check their Mode I and Mode

CARDACI

II. We were doing IFF checks. We were checking Mode III's and Mode IV's routinely. We did check Mode I's and II's but not consistently throughout the mission. I can't recall what was in the SPINS as far as guidance on conducting IFF checks. That's where it would have come from. It would have had to have been in the OPC SPINS, and I don't recall whether there was anything specific on checking all Modes.

In talking about a requirement for the helicopters to stay on enroute frequency, I recall that it was part of the SPINS because it was also in the SPINS for the simulator, the practice sim, that we do prior to going over there that they would stay on the enroute frequency. I do not have any further information that I would like to provide relating to the matters we've discussed. (The standard witness caution was given and the witness had no questions. The interview was concluded at 2052.)

I certify that the foregoing is a true and accurate summary of the testimony of **FIRST LIEUTENANT FRANCES M. CARDACI**, as given to the Aircraft Accident Investigation Board.



WILLIAM K. AT LEE, JR, Col, USAF
Legal Advisor

CARDACI

**SUMMARIZED TESTIMONY
MAJOR RAYMOND E. CHARLESWORTH
963rd AIRBORNE WARNING & CONTROL SQUADRON
TINKER AFB, OK**

The interview was conducted by Major Aaron D. Byas at Ramstein Air Base, Germany, beginning at 1623 hours, 21 June 1994. A witness advisement of rights was given in accordance with AFR 110-14, and the witness was sworn. This was a telephonic interview. The Board members were located at Ramstein AB, Germany. The witness was located at Tinker AFB, Oklahoma, and was identified there by a judge advocate.

EXAMINATION

I am currently a flight commander and also a mission crew commander. I have been a mission crew commander for approximately two years. I have flown as part of an AWACS mission crew in Operation PROVIDE COMFORT (OPC). I entered Turkey on 15 February and departed on 8 March. My last sortie was approximately 5 March 1994. I did not have any prior tours before February 1994.

I understand that Eagle flight was the call sign of the Black Hawks. My understanding of their mission is that they were out there. We understood what their mission was. At the time when I did fly, to my recollection we did not talk to them and we did not flight follow them. It is my recollection that during my tour we did not talk to any helicopters and we did not provide flight-follow service.

On my last OPC tour, I do not remember any specific guidance as far as talking to or providing flight follow for Eagle flight helicopter missions. During my in-briefing I do not recall any information pertaining to helicopter support. I recall the OPC staff providing me with a briefing upon my arrival. We did have an in-brief from our staff and we also had an in-brief from the Combined Forces staff also. I do not recollect any specific guidance as far as helicopter missions in northern Iraq.

I was aware of helicopter operations in the TAOR. I do not recall any helicopters being in the TAOR prior to me going on station. I do not recall the radio frequency used by the helicopters in the TAOR. I am not aware of any requirement for all aircraft to change to the TAOR frequency once they enter that area. I was on the staff of AWACS operations when I was over there, but I did fly occasionally. Again, that was my first time there. My primary mission was not to fly as a primary member on the E-3, but I did fly missions. So, I really can't get that specific with the ROE and the rules as you are asking right now. I flew approximately four missions in the TAOR.

Since I was on the staff, I was responsible for providing in-briefings for new crews. That

CHARLESWORTH

briefing only included that the helicopters were out there and that is about it. I wasn't aware of any specific guidance for taking care of helicopters in the TAOR.

I don't remember doing any specific IFF checks on the helicopters. I remember if they were squawking, we did see them. That's all I can tell you as far as that goes. If the helicopters would have come up on the wrong frequency or with the incorrect Mode I, it is part of our procedures to have them go to the correct frequency and squawk the correct Mode I. I am sure if we had seen any kind of wrong IFF we would have notified the aircraft.

We would have known what the correct Mode I squawk was for the helicopters because it would be posted in the Frag ATO order and that is probably what we would go with. I have nothing further to add.

(The standard witness caution was given and the witness had no questions. The interview was concluded at 1636 hours.)

I certify that the foregoing is a true and accurate summary of the testimony of **MAJOR RAYMOND E. CHARLESWORTH**, as given to the Aircraft Accident Investigation Board.



WILLIAM K. AT LEE, JR., Col, USAF
Legal Advisor

CHARLESWORTH

**SUMMARIZED TESTIMONY
CAPTAIN KATHLEEN C. CHRISTIAN
963RD AWACS
TINKER AFB, OK**

The interview was conducted by Major Aaron D. Byas at Ramstein Air Base, Germany, beginning at 1830 hours, 21 June 1994. A witness advisement of rights was given in accordance with AFR 110-14, and the witness was sworn. This was a telephonic interview. The Board members were located at Ramstein AB, Germany. The witness was located at Tinker AFB, Oklahoma, and was identified by a judge advocate.

EXAMINATION

I am Captain Kathleen C. Christian. My organization is the 963rd AWACS at Tinker AFB, Oklahoma. I am a Senior Director and an Evaluator Weapons Director. I have been a Senior Director since December 1992. I have been a Weapons Director since February 1989.

I have flown as part of an AWACS mission crew in Operation PROVIDE COMFORT (OPC). The first tour was for one month in July-August 1993. I was there from 7 March to 11 April 1994. During both tours, I operated as a Senior Director.

As far as the UH-60 Black Hawk helicopters, call sign Eagle Flight mission, in the northern no-fly zone of Iraq, I know that sometimes they check in with us. As far as I know, if we are aware of their presence, the AWACS' responsibility to them is to give them any kind of a threat call if anyone is in the no-fly zone who is not supposed to be there. I am not aware of any change in the responsibilities of the AWACS towards the helicopters. As far as in-theater in-briefings about AWACS' responsibilities toward the Eagle Flights during my last tour, we had an in-flight briefing prior to leaving Tinker and one when we got in-country. They said those missions existed and if we could maintain situational awareness as to where they were, we were supposed to point out anything that was inappropriate.

We were briefed by the OPC staff. I don't remember if helicopter operation was covered during that briefing. It's kind of hard to say whether I would consider the helicopters operating out of Diyarbakir as part of the OPC package; because, they're in the frag and we know their squawks, but we don't have the same kind of communication or continuity that we have with the other players in the Provide Comfort arena. If the Eagle flights were operating inside the northern no-fly zone of Iraq prior to our going on station, we would not be aware of them unless we were told that either by the ground or through the . . .

(At this time, the phone line was disconnected. Telephonic contact was reestablished within about four minutes, and the interview continued at 1844 hours).

CHRISTIAN

As far as the last question, we could tell by the frag, but we would not necessarily see them. I don't recall if the frag had specific information regarding flight times and routes.

I don't recall departing the area with helicopters remaining in the Tactical Area of Operation. As far as helicopters flying in the Tactical Area of Operation and not talking to the AWACS, I believe that happened sometimes. Sometimes we would have communications with them for awhile and then we wouldn't have communications. At that time, we would assume that they had landed. I think the radio frequency used by the Eagle Flight in the TAOR probably depended on the crew. As far as I remember from my crew, we kept them on the enroute frequency. I do not recall any procedures which required the helicopters to be on the TAOR frequency. I do not recall if the Mode I squawk for the Eagle Flights for the UH-60 helicopters was the same inside and outside the TAOR. I know there were specified Mode I's, but I cannot say for sure if everybody was supposed to be the same one. I know they rotated. I don't know if the helicopters were the same, but I believe everybody else was the same. I don't recall if the helicopters were required to use the same Mode I as the fighter aircraft.

If I observed an aircraft in the TAOR with the incorrect Mode I, I would see if anyone was talking to them, the WD's, or if they had comms with anybody that we weren't aware of. If not, I would ensure with surveillance that there was a valid track at the position, the Mode I. I would check the frag to make sure that we're not missing anything and then probably make sure that the fighters were aware that somebody was out there that we weren't sure of who it was. WD stands for weapons director. As far as what IFF checks that were done routinely on the Eagle flights as they entered the TAOR, I'm not sure about this because I was not necessarily involved in the weapons director portion. When they checked in, we usually had a Mode III, and then we would probably do a Mode IV check. I do not recall doing a Mode I on any of the aircraft entering the TAOR. I don't believe checking the Mode I was part of the procedures for checking aircraft operating in the TAOR.

If I noticed an aircraft squawking an incorrect Mode I, we would tell them to recycle their Mode I. As far as checking Mode I's as part of our procedure, what usually happens is, we put in LOCATE SIF which is a little letter associated with the Mode I. But that's purely technique, and I'm not sure that it's done everytime for everyone. As far as knowing whether anybody had an incorrect Mode I, the procedure for the Mode I, most of the time for us, is that on the hour and the half hour, we do a time hack call and they're aware at that time to rotate their Mode I's. We would not individually check each flight.


Losing helicopters from the screen was partially due to what the radar capabilities were. When we lost contact and assumed that they had landed, we would not take any further action. I flew approximately 18 missions in both of my tours in OPC.

I do not have any matters that I would like to add to what we have discussed.

CHRISTIAN

(The standard witness caution was given and the witness had no questions. The interview was concluded at 1854.)

I certify that the foregoing is a true and accurate summary of the testimony of **CAPTAIN KATHLEEN C. CHRISTIAN**, as given to the Aircraft Accident Investigation Board.


WILLIAM K. AT LEE, JR, Col, USAF
Legal Advisor

CHRISTIAN

**SUMMARIZED TESTIMONY
CAPTAIN JONATHAN E. FAIR
965TH AWACS
TINKER AFB, OK**

The interview was conducted by Major Aaron D. Byas at Ramstein Air Base, Germany, beginning at 1810 hours, 21 June 1994. A witness advisement of rights was given in accordance with AFR 110-14, and the witness was sworn. This was a telephonic interview. The Board members were located at Ramstein AB, Germany. The witness was located at Tinker AFB, Oklahoma, and was identified by a judge advocate.

EXAMINATION

I am Captain Jonathan E. Fair. My organization is the 965th AWACS, Tinker AFB, Oklahoma. My current duty position is as an Instructor, Senior Director in the squadron training shop. I have been an Instructor for approximately one year. I have been a Senior Director for two years.

I have flown as part of an AWACS mission crew in Operation PROVIDE COMFORT (OPC). I flew as a weapons director for Provide Comfort from September to October 1991. I was there for approximately 5 weeks. I then flew as part of the crew as a senior director from May to the middle of June 1993. I would say I have a combined total of 20 missions from the 2 trips.

As far as the UH-60 Black Hawk helicopters, call sign Eagle Flight, mission in the northern no-fly zone of Iraq, we would talk to them and they would fly across the border into the mountainous area. The AWACS' responsibility to those helicopters as far as control, we would get UHF radio contact with them and then provide flight-follow. We would look a distance in front of them to clear them of any other traffic. We also provided threat warnings on any enemy aircraft that might pose a threat to their flight path.

All the in-briefing I had on my last OPC tour was to be aware they would show up on the daily Air Tasking Order and we would be given the designated frequency that they would contact us on. That was all the briefing as far as the mission that they were doing. I did not receive any briefings from the OPC staff in regards to UH-60 Black Hawk helicopter operations.

I would say that there were no times that the Eagle Flights were in the TAOR before the AWACS called on station. I was not aware of any helicopter remaining in the TAOR once we departed station. It was part of our procedures to keep the helicopters on the enroute frequency during their entire time in the northern no-fly zone of Iraq. That controller had the best opportunity to monitor them. By keeping them on the separate frequencies, there would be no confusion as to who was talking to what aircraft at what time. The enroute controller would maintain communications with the helicopters as they operate in the northern no-fly zone of Iraq. I am aware of requirements for all the aircraft to change over to a TAOR frequency once they entered the TAOR. We used that for all the jet aircraft that would be performing their missions at higher than

FAIR

the speeds of the helicopters. That way we could deconflict who was talking to what aircraft at what time. I do not recall that there was a TAOR clear frequency available for helicopter operations.

I don't recall if the Mode I squawk for the Eagle Flight was the same outside the TAOR as it was inside the TAOR. I know we used rotating Mode I's. When they actually changed, whether it was by time or geographic location, I cannot remember at this point. As far as any requirement for all aircraft in the TAOR to use the same Mode I at any given time, I can't give you a definite answer. To me, that would make sense if that was briefed, but I cannot be one hundred percent sure that that's what was contained in the Air Tasking Order. If I observed an aircraft squawking the incorrect Mode I, it was common procedure to notify the aircraft to change to the correct Mode I. We would use it to determine which were friendlies and which were unknown.

As part of our procedures, we normally check Mode I on all aircraft entering and operating in the northern no-fly zone. That was part of the enroute controller's duty. He would also check Mode II and Mode III to make sure that they matched what was published in the daily Air Tasking Order. He would check the Mode IV to ensure that it was a "SWEET" squawk before he went into that area. I did not perceive any change in AWACS' responsibility and procedures regarding the Eagle Flights and their operation in the no-fly zone of Iraq.

The matters we briefed regarding radio frequencies were practices of the crew. Of course, we didn't operate autonomously. Anything we would do we would work through the staff there at our forward operating base so we weren't doing anything that would be abnormal. Checking the Modes was a function of established procedure for a weapons director in general. If it was actually written in the Air Tasking Order or the Airspace Control Order, I do not recall. I do know that is standard operating procedure for wherever we go in, operating in such an environment. The controller who has that responsibility is normally the check-in controller or in this case, the enroute controller, who picked up those taskings and responsibilities. Those apply to all aircraft.

As far as if we had a procedure for handling a situation where we had a helicopter that checked in with us and we lost radar, IFF, and radio contact with that helicopter while it was in the TAOR, because of the geography, speeds, and altitude those aircraft fly, it was possible to lose radar and radio contact. If that happened, we would dead reckon for the most part. Also, we would usually have information as to their expected location and time, where they would land, where they would have a drop zone if they were doing that type of mission, and we would do our best to dead reckon their location until we received positive radar and positive IFF contact on that helicopter. If we didn't, for any unknown, we would inform them if we had radio contact. If we would not, we would broadcast in the blind and pass tactical information to them off of a common point. That would be for threat information so if they could hear us and we could not hear them, then they would still be receiving the information they would need to perform their job safely. That's an established procedure, but I don't recall if that was written in the daily Air Tasking Order or Airspace Control Order.

I don't want to say that is technique only because I know, as an instructor, that is how we teach our young weapons directors who have just come into the career field. As far as dead

FAIR

reckoning, I am referring to a practice of determining the expected point for a helicopter based on its last known heading and speed. I do not have any information that I would like to add to the information we have covered here.

(The standard witness caution was given and the witness had no questions. The interview was concluded at 1828.)

I certify that the foregoing is a true and accurate summary of the testimony of **CAPTAIN JONATHAN E. FAIR**, as given to the Aircraft Accident Investigation Board.

William K At Lee, Jr

WILLIAM K. AT LEE, COL, JR., USAF
Legal Advisor

FAIR

**SUMMARIZED TESTIMONY
MAJOR DARYL K. FITZGERALD
552nd TRAINING SQUADRON
TINKER AFB, OK**

The interview was conducted by Major Aaron D. Byas at Ramstein Air Base, Germany, beginning at 1610 hours, 21 June 1994. A witness advisement of rights was given in accordance with AFR 110-14, and the witness was sworn. This was a telephonic interview. The Board members were located at Ramstein AB, Germany. The witness was located at Tinker AFB, Oklahoma, and was identified there by a judge advocate.

EXAMINATION

My current duty position is mission crew commander, currently upgrading to instructor mission crew commander. My check ride from the training squadron for mission crew commander was accomplished 31 August 1993. Prior to becoming a mission crew commander, I flew missions as a senior director and weapons director. I was stationed here at Tinker from 1984 through 1989 and I flew as a weapons director and instructor weapons director during that time period.

I have not flown any of those positions during my current tour. During my current tour I have only flown as a mission crew commander.

I have had one tour in Operation PROVIDE COMFORT (OPC). During that period, I flew approximately five to six missions. I was at OPC from 15 October through 2 November 1993. I know nothing about the Black Hawk mission operations in the TAOR. I was not made aware of the UH-60 helicopter flight operations in the no-fly zone when I was over there.

During the time that I was over there, before we went up on a mission we were briefed on any U.N. helicopter missions or U.N. flights that were to take place. We did not always get information on whether a U.N. flight would be flying the particular day that we would be flying. During the in-brief we sometimes received information that referenced U.N. helicopter or U.S. helicopter flight operations in OPC in the TAOR. I know we were briefed by the Turkish staff in place there and we were also briefed by our own AWACS personnel. I do not remember specifically being briefed about the UH-60s. I do remember that the staff did brief that sometimes when we flew there would be some U.N. flights up. I was not aware of any UH-60 helicopter operations going on in the TAOR prior to going on station. The only thing we got briefed on was U.N. flights.

On one particular instance while I was over there, I recall that before we took off for our mission, we were to be briefed that there was a U.N. flight . . . There was no U.N. flight that was supposed to be up on this particular day that I flew; however, a U.N. helicopter flight came up over the Guard frequency and said, "I don't know if you all got this information on us, but we


FITZGERALD

are here and we are coming across." At the time they came up on our frequency, we sent him to a discreet frequency that was separate from the frequency that we would be talking to the fighters on. But we had no information that this particular U.N. flight, on this particular day, was going to be there.

We provided IFF checks on that helicopter. The normal IFF check procedures for aircraft entering the no-fly zone is that we check their Mode I and Mode IVs. I'm not positive, but I do believe that all aircraft in the TAOR were supposed to use the same Mode I squawk. When that U.N. flight came in and called us on a guard, when we took control of that flight, I do not remember if it went to a particular Mode I squawk, but we were able to positively identify him.

(The standard witness caution was given and the witness had no questions. The interview was concluded at 1620 hours.)

I certify that the foregoing is a true and accurate summary of the testimony of **MAJOR DARYL K. FITZGERALD** as given to the Aircraft Accident Investigation Board.


WILLIAM K. AT LEE, JR., COL, USAF
Legal Advisor

FITZGERALD

**SUMMARIZED TESTIMONY
CAPTAIN CHARLES D. GRAHN
964th AIRBORNE WARNING AND CONTROL SQUADRON
TINKER AFB, OK**

The interview was conducted by Major Aaron D. Byas at Ramstein Air Base, Germany, beginning at 1658 hours, 21 June 1994. A witness advisement of rights was given in accordance with AFR 110-14, and the witness was sworn. This was a telephonic interview. The Board members were located at Ramstein AB, Germany. The witness was located at Tinker AFB, Oklahoma, and was identified there by a judge advocate.

EXAMINATION

Currently I am a senior director. I have been a senior director approximately two months. Prior to becoming a senior director I was a weapons director. I have not flown any Operation PROVIDE COMFORT (OPC) missions as a senior director. I have flown OPC missions as a weapons director. The last tour that I had at OPC was approximately 27 December 1992 through approximately 1 March 1993. During that tour I flew approximately nineteen sorties. That rotation was my only OPC. I was there for approximately sixty days and I flew about nineteen missions.

When I was over there, the Eagles were the helicopters that were ferrying military personnel and possibly other civilian personnel for the negotiations. They would fly them into Iraq and to various landing strips in northern Iraq for communications purposes with the Kurds and the Iraqis.

If I was working the position on console, those helicopters would check up with me on the radio. I would attempt to find them on radar and, basically, we would log the times that we got radios with them. We would check their gap time, at what time and at what points they were supposed to enter the country at and get clearance for them from our Turkish controllers on board. There have been several different deployments since I have been there and to the best that I can remember, that is what I did over there. I cannot remember if I worked Eagle flights as the enroute controller. I worked as a TAOR controller. As Eagle flights entered the northern no-fly zone we would find them on both radar and IFF and we would perform Mode IV checks on all aircraft. I do not know if it is part of our procedures to check Mode I. To the best of my knowledge all aircraft were supposed to be up on the same TAOR frequency when they entered the area after coming from check in. I cannot recall having any helicopters up on the same frequency as our fighter aircraft. I'm not sure if we had helicopters on a separate frequency from the fighter aircraft. I do not know of any helicopters operating in the northern no-fly zone of Iraq prior to our aircraft calling on station. I do not know if there were still helicopters in the northern no-fly zone when we were departing the area, I don't remember.


During my in-briefing we were briefed that there would be Eagles flying at times that we

GRAHN

would be airborne. That briefing covered our responsibility towards those helicopters. I feel that my responsibility for checking Mode IV checks on helicopters is the same as that for fighter aircraft. To the best of my memory all aircraft were Fragged for the same Mode I's during the same time blocks and they would rotate at a predetermined time. I'm not sure if I remember making specific Mode I checks in the TAOR while I was performing my duties as a TAOR controller. Only Mode IV checks are part of my procedure.

To the best of my knowledge, there were no representatives from the combined force staff present at the in-briefings. I don't have any information I would like to add.
(The standard witness caution was given and the witness had no questions. The interview was concluded at 1714 hours.)

I certify that the foregoing is a true and accurate summary of the testimony of **CAPTAIN CHARLES D. GRAHN**, as given to the Aircraft Accident Investigation Board.


WILLIAM K. AT LEE, JR., COL, USAF
Legal Advisor

GRAHN

**SUMMARIZED TESTIMONY
CAPTAIN WILLIAM J. HARPER, JR
552ND TRAINING SQUADRON
TINKER AFB, OK**

The interview was conducted by Major Aaron D. Byas at Ramstein Air Base, Germany, beginning at 1945 hours, 21 June 1994. A witness advisement of rights was given in accordance with AFR 110-14, and the witness was sworn. This was a telephonic interview. The Board members were located at Ramstein AB, Germany. The witness was located at Tinker AFB, Oklahoma, and was identified by a judge advocate.

EXAMINATION

I am Captain William J. Harper. My organization is the 552nd Training Squadron, Tinker AFB, OK. My present duty assignment is Instructor Weapons Director. I have been a Weapons Director for three years and four months.

I have flown as part of an AWACS mission crew in support of Operation PROVIDE COMFORT (OPC). The dates of my last tour were January through March 1993. I had tours prior to that. I have approximately 50 OPC missions. My previous tour in OPC was in June to July 1992 and also June to July 1991. I had the opportunity to perform the duties of enroute controller, TAOR controller, and tanker controller during those tours.

As far as what the UH-60 Black Hawk helicopters, call sign Eagle Flight, mission in the northern no-fly zone of Iraq was, I'd have to look at an Air Tasking Order to correctly answer that. Generally, the interaction with us would be a flight-follow interaction in support of UN operations in northern Iraq. Regarding the AWACS' responsibility toward those helicopters, it was intermittent as far as the radar coverage. I can't remember if there was a specific Eagle Flight there during the time periods of my tours. As far as in-theater in-briefings received about the AWACS' responsibility toward the UH-60 Black Hawk, call sign Eagle Flight, on my last OPC tour, the in-brief that we got would have been along the lines of where they were flying from and to, as far as the bases. The OPC staff provided us with briefings. Those briefings included helicopter operations.

I can't recall if there were any UH-60 Black Hawk helicopter flight operations inside the northern no-fly zone of Iraq prior to our aircraft calling on station. If there were any Black Hawk helicopters flying in the northern no-fly zone during our on station time and not under our control, the procedure would have had them checking up on our frequencies. As far as whether the Black Hawk helicopters used the enroute control frequency, or another tactical TAOR frequency, as they operated in the northern no-fly zone of Iraq, it's been almost a year now and I would have to look at the ATO to see what frequency. I believe I was aware of a requirement for all aircraft to change to the TAOR frequency. I considered the requirement for all aircraft to monitor the TAOR frequency as applying to the helicopters. I was aware of the requirement for

HARPER

all aircraft in the TAOR to squawk the same Mode I. If they didn't squawk the correct Mode I, our procedures were to interrogate the aircraft to find out what they were squawking. I don't really recall any situations where they were not squawking the correct Mode I.


Part of our procedures was to check the Mode I of all the aircraft in the TAOR. As the enroute control function, the IFF Modes and codes we interrogated on the aircraft prior to entering the TAOR were Modes I, II, III, and IV. Once the aircraft entered the TAOR (the helicopters specifically) and we'd lose contact in the mountainous terrain, our procedure was to extrapolate the symbology until such time as we established radar or IFF contact with them again. The extrapolation would be on the previously known heading, altitude and speed.

As far as checking all modes and codes, there was a requirement to do that during the initial check-in phase. That would be the checking of Modes IV, II and III for positive ID and also I. This is what we teach in the school for identifying aircraft, because Modes II and III are our best ways of identifying the aircraft individually. In Mode I, you would have more than one aircraft squawking the same Mode I at the same time. As far as any written requirement to do that, they were probably in the SPIN section of the operating book there. I don't recall any occasions where the Black Hawk helicopters flew in the TAOR without checking in with us.

I don't have anything I'd like to add to the interview or the matters we've discussed. I wish my knowledge was a little more helpful in this investigation. It's been over a year since I was there; and other exercises and deployments between there; things that go on on the airplane tend to get fused together after awhile.

(The standard witness caution was given and the witness had no questions. The interview was concluded at 2001.)

I certify that the foregoing is a true and accurate summary of the testimony of **CAPTAIN WILLIAM J. HARPER, JR.**, as given to the Aircraft Accident Investigation Board.


WILLIAM K. AT LEE, JR, Col, USAF
Legal Advisor

HARPER

**SUMMARIZED TESTIMONY
MAJOR BRITT L. JUSTMANN
965th AWACS
TINKER AFB, OK**

The interview was conducted by Major Aaron D. Byas at Ramstein Air Base, Germany, beginning at 1640 hours, 21 June 1994. A witness advisement of rights was given in accordance with AFR 110-14, and the witness was sworn. This was a telephonic interview. The Board members were located at Ramstein AB, Germany. The witness was located at Tinker AFB, Oklahoma, and was identified there by a judge advocate.

EXAMINATION

Currently, I am a mission crew commander. I have been a mission crew commander since August of 1993. I have flown Operation PROVIDE COMFORT (OPC) missions as a mission crew commander. I was over at OPC from January until nearly the end of February of this year. That is the only tour I have had at OPC so far. During that tour I flew six operational missions.

The only thing I know about UH-60 Black Hawk missions in the no-fly zone of Iraq is what I have heard reported on the news. The E-3 will provide command and control for any aircraft within that area. The E-3 would have to be on station. There would be some exceptions. It would depend on where that particular aircraft was also going. Into the mountainous terrain we would not necessarily see or hear from it.

It's been a long time since I've been there. It's very difficult for me to remember helicopters. I don't believe I had any helicopter flights that were actually in the no-fly zone during my missions. We did have some but I don't think they got that far south. It is correct to say that I do not believe had any that were actually controlled by my crew.

Generally speaking, there should have been a requirement for all aircraft to change to the TAOR frequency once they entered the TAOR. That would include helicopters. If the helicopters did not come up on our frequency, it is doubtful that we would be able to talk to them at all. I was aware of some helicopters in the TAOR that we weren't controlling or that we weren't talking to. That would have been during our on station period.

We did have Mode I specifically assigned. It's been too long so that I do not remember if the Mode I for the helicopters was the same Mode I as that used outside the TAOR.

On the sorties that I flew, there would have been no IFF checks performed on the helicopters. As far as I can remember, we had no helicopters scheduled in the AOR. In my previous statement I stated that during one of my on station periods there were helicopters in the TAOR. I did not say U.S. helicopters. There were helicopters in that area. We asked the ground

JUSTMANN

if they knew who they were. To the best of my recollection, I am not aware of any U.S. or OPC helicopters in the TAOR during my missions that I was not controlling or not talking to.

I would like to add something that may help clear things up. The helicopters I am talking about that were in the AOR were Turkish in support of OPC. I have no further information to add.

(The standard witness caution was given and the witness had no questions. The interview was concluded at 1656 hours.)

I certify that the foregoing is a true and accurate summary of the testimony of **MAJOR BRITT L. JUSTMANN**, as given to the Aircraft Accident Investigation Board.



WILLIAM K. AT LEE, JR., Col, USAF
Legal Advisor

JUSTMANN

**SUMMARIZED TESTIMONY
1ST LT PRESTON D. KISE
562nd TRAINING SQUADRON
TINKER AFB, OK**

The interview was conducted by Major Aaron D. Byas at Ramstein Air Base, Germany, beginning at 2114 hours, 21 June 1994. A witness advisement of rights was given in accordance with AFR 110-14, and the witness was sworn. This was a telephonic interview. The Board members were located at Ramstein AB, Germany. The witness was located at Tinker AFB, Oklahoma, and was identified there by a judge advocate.

EXAMINATION

I am presently an instructor weapons director. I completed weapons director training at Tinker AFB in March 1992. I have flown as part of the AWACS mission crew in Operation PROVIDE COMFORT (OPC). I have had two tours in OPC. I would guess that I have fifteen flights in both tours, together. The first tour was in July 1992 and the second ended in July of 1993. I had the opportunity to perform duties as enroute controller, TAOR controller, and tanker controller.

I know that usually the UH-60 Black Hawk helicopters take off from Turkey. Most of the time they are scheduled missions; however, I believe that some of the missions we talked to were not scheduled. I know that they were very difficult for us to see on our radar because of the altitude that they flew and the locations they flew in. My responsibility toward those helicopters was to maintain tracking on them as much as possible, to maintain communications with them, and to know where they were in their routes, as much as possible, but often that was very difficult or impossible to do.

I received information at the original in-briefing about AWACS responsibilities toward the UH-60 helicopters on my last OPC tour although it was not very detailed in length and I also received more information from the staff people that would fly with us on the first mission. I was briefed by the OPC staff. The briefing from the OPC staff at the base level did not include any information about helicopters; however, at the unit level it did.

I can't honestly remember if I received information or not on any helicopter operations in the northern no-fly zone of Iraq prior to me going on station. Usually, on the ATO breakout that we had, if there would be one in the no-fly zone, we would have knowledge of it. But as I said, not all of the flights were on the ATO breakout. I cannot recall of any instances where there would be helicopters or aircraft in the TAOR when we went off station.

I know that the UH-60 Black Hawk helicopters were supposed to stay on the enroute frequency while operating in the northern no-fly zone of Iraq. My assumption is that they were, but because of the terrain differences between where we were and they were, communications

KISE

were often very difficult to achieve. I cannot honestly remember, but I believe the helicopters stayed on the enroute frequency, but I'm not sure on that.

I believe there was a requirement for all aircraft operating in the TAOR to be on a TAOR frequency. That would apply to helicopters. I don't believe there is a differentiation between Mode I squawks inside and outside the TAOR for aircraft or helicopters. I was aware of the requirement that all aircraft operating in the TAOR to have the same Mode I. Normally the way that my console and those of my crew were loaded, we would only notice if the helicopter was squawking a correct Mode I. But we frequently would not get any Mode indications; Mode I, II, or otherwise, from helicopters in the AOR, in which case we would notify them about that. They would not always come up on it. And it was very hard to tell if they were squawking correctly or not.

As long as we had good tracking on the helicopters, we would do a Mode IV check, which would either be sweet or sour and we would monitor it Mode II that was assigned to it throughout the duration of the mission.

There were no requirements for us to perform Mode I checks on aircraft in the northern no-fly zone of Iraq. Our normal procedure for monitoring helicopters in the northern no-fly zone of Iraq, once they disappeared from our scope because of mountainous terrains, we would give them radio checks to make sure where they were. We would want them to tell us when they settled down on the land to do whatever mission they had, when they took off again, and where they were enroute to. Other than radio checks with them every few minutes when we couldn't see them, there was nothing else we could do.

In most cases, I would try and keep the symbology tracking on approximately the route that I thought the helicopter was on.

The only reason that Eagle Flights would possibly be on an enroute frequency would be if we were having problems getting them up on the TAOR frequency or if the TAOR frequency was so saturated that we couldn't give them proper flight following on it. When they came out of Turkey into the AOR, they would have to check up on the enroute frequency. To the best of my recollection, once they entered the TAOR, we would try to bring them up on the TAOR frequency. Depending on the communication situation that might not be possible.

I would like to add that it was very difficult often, aside from tracking and listening to the helicopters, it was very difficult to get the Eagle helicopters to squawk proper modes and codes. We would harp on them frequently throughout the mission and frequently they wouldn't do it. Whether that was a problem with our system noticing it, whether it was a problem with their system, or what it was, I couldn't tell you. But we often had problems getting proper responses from them. I don't believe that it would be wrong modes and codes because of the way I would set up my scope. If they had a wrong mode and code on my scope, I probably would not notice it. The only thing I would notice is if they weren't squawking the mode and code I was looking

KISE

for. Whether that was a reception and transmission problem or an ROE problem with them, I couldn't tell you.

(The standard witness caution was given and the witness had no questions. The interview was concluded at 2131 hours.)

I certify that the foregoing is a true and accurate summary of the testimony of **1ST LT PRESTON D. KISE**, as given to the Aircraft Accident Investigation Board.



WILLIAM K. AT LEE, JR., Col, USAF
Legal Advisor

KISE

**SUMMARIZED TESTIMONY
MAJOR DOMINICK B. KNIGHT
966th AWACS
TINKER AFB, OK**

The interview was conducted by Major Aaron D. Byas at Ramstein Air Base, Germany, beginning at 1513 hours, 21 June 1994. A witness advisement of rights was given in accordance with AFR 110-14, and the witness was sworn. This was a telephonic interview. The Board members were located at Ramstein AB, Germany. The witness was located at Tinker AFB, Oklahoma, and was identified there by a judge advocate.

EXAMINATION

I am Major Dominick B. Knight. My organization is 966th AWACS, Tinker AFB, OK. My present duty assignment is Assistant Operations Officer. My crew position is mission crew commander instructor. I have been a mission crew commander for two years.

I have flown as part of an AWACS crew in Operation PROVIDE COMFORT (OPC). One tour was approximately thirty days, total. During that period of time I had approximately ten flights. This tour occurred approximately a year ago in 1993.

I am familiar with the helicopters that fly in and out of the TAOR. I have read and understand the Eagle Flight operations. The general nature of AWACS responsibility towards helicopters that transit in and out of that area is that we would talk to them on the frequencies when they check in with us. As with all aircraft under our control, AWACS' responsibility toward the Eagle flights was traffic deconfliction and to keep them safe. We did receive an in-brief referencing the helicopters operations. Our in-theater staff provided us with that briefing. There was a designated representative from the OPC staff that provided us with briefings. The position of that individual from OPC was a part of the staff. I believe he was one of the commander's executive officers. That briefing was an overview of what was going on there. Helicopter operations were a part of the briefing. I do not know if there were times when the Eagle flight was in the TAOR before the AWACS was on station. I do not recall going on station with helicopters in the TAOR. I do not recall departing the area with helicopters in the TAOR.

I don't recall the radio frequency used for the Eagle Flights in the TAOR. I don't remember if they squawked a Mode I. From what I remember, we would do IFF checks. I don't remember whether they were using a squawk which was the same as the squawk for outside the TAOR, or if it was a squawk for inside the TAOR, because it's been quite a while since I've used it.

I do not recall any procedures requiring an AWACS to change the helicopters frequency once they entered the TAOR. They should have. With my crew, I don't remember having to

KNIGHT

direct the helicopters to change their frequencies. During our tour, I don't remember an incident of them forgetting to change squawks and us reminding or directing them to change squawks.

I have no further information to add.

(The standard witness caution was given and the witness had no questions. The interview was concluded at 1533 hours.)

I certify that the foregoing is a true and accurate summary of the testimony of **MAJOR DOMINICK B. KNIGHT**, as given to the Aircraft Accident Investigation Board.



WILLIAM K. AT LEE, JR., Col, USAF
Legal Advisor

KNIGHT

**SUMMARIZED TESTIMONY
1ST LT DOUGLAS O. KUGLER
963rd AWACS SQUADRON
TINKER AFB, OK**

The interview was conducted by Major Aaron D. Byas at Ramstein Air Base, Germany, beginning at 2134 hours, 21 June 1994. A witness advisement of rights was given in accordance with AFR 110-14, and the witness was sworn. This was a telephonic interview. The Board members were located at Ramstein AB, Germany. The witness was located at Tinker AFB, Oklahoma, and was identified there by a judge advocate.

EXAMINATION

I am presently a weapons director. I received the weapons director controller badge in September of 1992 and became mission ready in AWACS by the end of June 1993. I have flown as part of an AWACS mission crew in Operation PROVIDE COMFORT (OPC) twice. I flew in July and August of 1993 and March and April of 1994. My first flight was 18 March 1994 and my last one on that deployment was 10 April 1994.

I had the opportunity to perform the enroute, the TAOR, and the tanker controller duties. Our crew pretty much rotated those positions with each flight. You would serve in one position for one flight and the next flight you would rotate to another position.

I pretty much knew that the UH-60 Black Hawk helicopter missions in the TAOR were fringed aircraft for the TAOR. They checked in and we pretty much did area monitor work for them. We were involved with them with the enroute position and in the TAOR position as well.

Initially, when we arrived in country, we spent pretty much a full day getting spun up on the rule of things and I vaguely remember it was covered what our role was with the UH-60 helicopters. That was in addition to any preparation we did in the simulator sessions back here. We received a briefing from the Combined Task Force staff on what the mission was in-theater. It took place on our first or second day there before we ever flew. To be honest with you, I really don't remember any information given in that briefing pertaining to helicopter operations.

I was not aware of any helicopter operations in the northern no-fly zone of Iraq that took place when the AWACS was not on station. Any time that we had flown, before we left off station, we pretty much had accountability of any friendly forces that were airborne and I don't remember any helicopters ever being airborne in AOR while we were getting ready to go off station. I had the opportunity of monitoring helicopters as they operated in the northern no-fly zone of Iraq. I was involved with them when I was enroute controller and when I was AOR controller. I don't remember the frequencies that I had those aircraft on. They checked up on the check-in frequency and it was common practice with our crew to push them to the AOR

KUGLER

frequency once they were in the AOR. I'm pretty sure that it was a clear frequency.

I don't remember it being a requirement to have all aircraft on the same TAOR frequency, but it is common practice if someone is flying in AOR for them to be under the control of that controller. As they are transitioning through the gates to go into the AOR, then usually they are handed from one frequency to the other.

Thinking back, I think there were two different Mode I's. One was for outside the AOR and one was for in the AOR. But I've done some flying since then and I really can't remember. If I noticed a helicopter squawking an incorrect Mode I, I would pretty much tell them to recycle the Mode I; however, I'd also be looking at all the other codes to crosscheck everything. I won't say it is necessarily standard. Generally we are working off of II's, III's and we will do a Mode IV check. But if there is any question about what it is, generally we will check all four modes.

Usually we checked Mode II on UH-60 Black Hawk helicopters as they entered the northern no-fly zone of Iraq. I think it was pretty standard for that; and Mode IV to make sure their Mode IV was good. As the helicopters are operating in the northern no-fly zone of Iraq and the helicopters enter the mountainous terrain and you lose IFF radar contact and radio contact with those aircraft, our normal procedure is to go out over the frequency and give their call sign as "faded." However, periodically you will still go out to try to pick them up on the radios. Generally, if they were going to be doing some kind of low work, occasionally we got information from the helicopter pilots that they would either be landing or going low. It is common that there were times when they would be flying low and you would lose radio contact with them; however, we train that we keep talking on the frequency in case we burn through something and they hear us and we don't hear them. During that period of time, I would reinitiate the symbology with what we call a zero speed.

If once it is faded, you wouldn't have a whole lot of situational awareness unless you knew where that helicopter was landing or what area he was working. If I pretty much knew the destination of the helicopter was near where the symbology was parked, you would probably make the assumption that he had landed there. And if it wasn't, then I would keep the symbology parked there until I started to get some kind of return some place else. And once we get a return some place else, then I would pretty much do an IFF check on the different modes we discussed earlier to see if that was actually him and then try to make radio contact.

I think you pretty much covered the one thing I wanted to mention about when they are flying low it is possible to lose radio contact and possibly lose radar contact as well.

I have no further information to add.

KUGLER

(The standard witness caution was given and the witness had no questions. The interview was concluded at 2131 hours.)

I certify that the foregoing is a true and accurate summary of the testimony of 1ST LT **DOUGLAS O. KUGLER**, as given to the Aircraft Accident Investigation Board.



WILLIAM K. AT LEE, JR., Col, USAF
Legal Advisor

KUGLER

**SUMMARIZED TESTIMONY
CAPTAIN GREGOR J. LEIST
964TH AWACS
TINKER AFB, OK**

The interview was conducted by Major Aaron D. Byas at Ramstein Air Base, Germany, beginning at 1922 hours, 21 June 1994. A witness advisement of rights was given in accordance with AFR 110-14, and the witness was sworn. This was a telephonic interview. The Board members were located at Ramstein AB, Germany. The witness was located at Tinker AFB, Oklahoma, and was identified by a judge advocate.

EXAMINATION

My name is Captain Gregor J. Leist. My organization is the 964th AWACS, Tinker AFB, Oklahoma. My current duty position is Senior Director aboard the E-3. I have been a Senior Director for about eight weeks. I just completed the upgrade. I have been a Weapons Director for almost two years.

I have flown as part of an AWACS mission crew in Operation PROVIDE COMFORT (OPC). The first tour was from April to early May 1992 for 28 days. The second tour was October to early November 1993 for 30 days. I have just completed a tour from 10 May to 16 June 1994.

(The witness was advised that his answers to the following questions should be based on his understanding regarding matters prior to 14 April 1994, and that all of the questions would relate to his actions and procedures known to him at that time. The witness stated that he understood and would not make any reference to matters which occurred or understandings created by his activity in the last tour.)

As far as the UH-60 Black Hawk helicopters, call sign Eagle Flight, missions in the northern no-fly zone of Iraq, my understanding of their mission was that they would ferry passengers from Diyarbakir or other bases in Turkey to the MCC in Zakhu, Iraq. The AWACS' responsibility to those helicopters performing that function was to track them. We would usually have radio contact with them, but not always. We would provide threat warnings and point out other friendly military aircraft operating in the area, and inform them of the presence of the Black Hawks. Between my first two tours, I did not perceive any change in the AWACS' responsibilities or procedures regarding the Eagle Flight operations.

As far as in-theater in-briefings or other information I received about AWACS' responsibilities toward the Eagle Flights on my previous two tours, during the in-brief, that particular item was not covered. In the readings, they talked about it, and my understanding was that they were basically passenger transports. Every time a crew lands, the OPC DO or his representative provides an in-briefing talking about the local operating procedures and any changes

LEIST

that had occurred. In my two previous tours, the briefing did not include helicopter operations. During those two tours, I was not aware of any UH-60 Black Hawk helicopters operating in the northern no-fly zone in Iraq, prior to my going on station. We would occasionally have a track pop up in the vicinity of Zakhu. They would be squawking, and our system recognizes that squawk and we're able to identify them as friendly traffic. We would never have voice contact with the Black Hawk prior to going on station.

At that time, occasionally we would go off station with a Black Hawk that had landed at Zakhu and not taken off again, but I cannot recall ever leaving station with a Black Hawk airborne either departing or entering Iraq. I am aware of helicopter operations in the northern no-fly zone that were not under our control. Occasionally, we would observe the squawks in the AOR and not have radio contact with them. However, we would have situational awareness that that was a friendly aircraft, due to the squawk. During the previous tours, when the helicopters were in the TAOR and they would check up, they would come up on enroute and then they'd push over to the AOR frequency. Usually, right about at the gate, which is the entrance point into Iraq, they would check up on the TAOR frequency to maintain continuity. That was the same procedure in 1992 and 1993.

I was aware of the requirement for all aircraft to change to the TAOR frequency. That did apply to all aircraft entering the no-fly zone, including helicopters. If they did not change over and remained on the enroute frequency, my response as a WD would be to call the Senior Director and ask him what I should do; but my first response would be to call the helicopter on the enroute frequency and tell him to push AOR which means to switch over to the AOR frequency. To my recollection, the helicopters would rotate their Mode I's inside the TAOR. They would squawk a separate Mode I outside, and then all aircraft entering the TAOR would recycle their Mode I and switch to the AOR for Mode I. I did observe that on the previous two tours. If an aircraft, and specifically a helicopter, did not change his Mode I, we would attempt to make contact with that aircraft and tell them to recycle or check Mode I. It is part of our normal procedures to check aircraft Mode I's as they are flying in the northern no-fly zone of Iraq.

As far as the IFF checks that are performed by the enroute controller for aircraft entering the northern no-fly zone, the E-3 has the capability to display a tabular display which contains all four Modes that an aircraft is squawking. The enroute controller displays that tabular display for each aircraft that checks up with him. For any unknown aircraft, that is part of the ID process. You pull up their SIF tabular display and check all the squawks that a particular aircraft is squawking. We check Mode IV and Mode I on aircraft entering the northern no-fly zone of Iraq. What I have just described is prescribed procedure, and it continues to be. We always are required to check the Modes and codes of aircraft entering the AOR. It is part of the spin ups and our local operating procedures in the ACO. Each crew member is required to read that and sign off on it prior flying their first sortie. I'm referring to the local operating procedures spin up. I'm referring to the materials at OPC as part of the in-theater training and the local training here at Tinker AFB. It's part of our spin up. We read the local ROE which is contained in our tactics shop here. Also, you read the ACO and make sure you're familiar with it so that by the time you

LEIST

get over there, reading that information is a review.

During the first two tours, in my opinion, I did not consider the Black Hawk helicopters to be part of the OPC operation. They were generally just an ancillary function that would check in and out pretty much at their convenience. We rarely, if ever, had any knowledge of their schedules. We kept an eye out for them; but if they didn't check up with us on voice frequencies, it was considered that they were on some type of special mission or no comm. We were not familiar with their operation.

I do not have anything to add to the matters we've discussed.

(The standard witness caution was given and the witness had no questions. The interview was concluded at 1940.)

I certify that the foregoing is a true and accurate summary of the testimony of **CAPTAIN GREGOR J. LEIST**, as given to the Aircraft Accident Investigation Board.



WILLIAM K. AT LEE, JR., Col, USAF
Legal Advisor

LEIST

**SUMMARIZED TESTIMONY
CAPTAIN RUBEN RIOS
963RD AWACS
TINKER AFB, OK**

The interview was conducted by Major Aaron D. Byas at Ramstein Air Base, Germany, beginning at 1858 hours, 21 June 1994. A witness advisement of rights was given in accordance with AFR 110-14, and the witness was sworn. This was a telephonic interview. The Board members were located at Ramstein AB, Germany. The witness was located at Tinker AFB, Oklahoma, and was identified by a judge advocate.

EXAMINATION

My name is Captain Ruben Rios. My organization is the 963rd AWACS, Tinker AFB, Oklahoma. My current duty position is Weapons Controller. I have been a Weapons Controller, mission ready, for a year and a half.

I have flown as part of an AWACS mission crew in Operation PROVIDE COMFORT (OPC). Each tour was approximately 30 days, and I've done 2 tours. I returned from my last tour on 1 April.

As far as the UH-60 Black Hawk helicopters, call sign Eagle Flight, missions in the northern no-fly zone of Iraq, they are helo sorties generated out of Turkey. They basically flew military personnel through the northwestern gate into Iraqi airspace and usually proceeded southeast for about 120 or 30 miles and would usually land at various locations. I had the opportunity to perform the duties as an enroute controller, a tanker controller, and a TAOR controller. My responsibility toward the helicopters entering the no-fly zone of Iraq was to find them on the radar scope. They would usually come up on the radios with a call sign looking for us. We would tell them we had contact on them and then track them until their point of landing. Usually, they would make a call at that point telling us they would be landing at a specific point.

The in-theater in-briefings we received about AWACS' responsibilities toward the Eagle flights on my last OPC tour were minimal, in terms of just to provide them with flight-following. Their call sign, and approximate take-off time was provided on the daily ATO and the flow sheet. Once they come up on freq, identify their position and track them until landing and do the same thing when they took off from Iraq heading back home. The individual who provided us with the briefing would be the WD or SD depending on who was covering the staff position at that time. We usually have a weapons staff person. We did not receive any briefings from the OPC staff regarding our responsibilities towards the helicopters.

I was not aware of any UH-60 Black Hawk helicopters operating in the northern no-fly zone of Iraq prior to calling on station. I recall departing the area going off station with

RIOS

helicopters staying in the TAOR. The general area where the helicopters were operating, when we departed and they were still in the TAOR, was southeast of Gate One for approximately 50, 75 to 100 miles. As far as recalling any UH-60 Black Hawk helicopters operating in the northern no-fly zone while we were on station, but which were not under our control: once they checked in, they would fly into the no-fly zone, we provided follow-on; if they landed, they had the option of again contacting us and they just didn't.

As the enroute controller or the TAOR controller, if a helicopter entered the no-fly zone, we maintained him on the enroute frequency. I do not know of any particular reason for that. There was a TAOR clear frequency available, but the helicopter was never instructed to go on the HAVE QUICK frequency. I was aware of requirements for all aircraft to change to the TAOR frequency, and the fighters would usually do that automatically on their own. I did not consider the helicopters as part of that requirement.

I can't recall if the Mode I for the helicopters operating inside the TAOR was the same as that of the fighters. If I'm not mistaken, the Mode I inside the TAOR was different from the Mode I outside the TAOR. I was aware of a requirement for all aircraft inside the TAOR to squawk the same Mode I. That applied to every player including the helicopters. The primary thing we check is a Mode IV more than a Mode I. As an enroute controller, you check the Mode IV on all the players, including helicopters, that are coming in. Mode I is something that comes up automatically on the scope, but it's not something that I have to take a specific switch action to interrogate. I know we do the Mode IV all the time. As part of our procedures, we do not have Mode I in our LOCATE SIF. That's a personal technique.

As a TAOR controller, there is a way to know if an aircraft is squawking an incorrect Mode I. To find out, you have to bring up a track tabular display on a specific track. That was technique only. It was not a requirement to bring up a track tabular display on any specific track. It was not part of our procedures to do Mode I checks on aircraft operating in the TAOR. We do Mode IV checks continuously. If we observed an aircraft operating in the northern no-fly zone of Iraq using the incorrect Mode I, we would probably notice whether or not they are squawking the Mode II and see if it matches what they're supposed to be squawking for the ATO. That would give me a mental alert. We really don't emphasize Mode I as much as the Mode II which are utilized in the ATO on a daily basis for each aircraft including the helos.

As the enroute controller, I recall an occurrence of a UH-60 Black Hawk helicopters entering the northern no-fly zone heading from one point to another inside that area and losing them in the mountainous terrain. The normal procedure after losing radar, radio, and IFF contact with those helicopters is you can extrapolate the track itself. You kind of begin to know exactly where they're heading for, so you extrapolate a track and head for that general direction. You would wait five or ten minutes until the dots reappear which they usually do, and you reinitiate the symbology where you get new dots. If the dots didn't reappear at that time, I would probably

RIOS


contact the helo and try to get a position. You can do that over the enroute frequency. WD stands for weapons director, and SD is senior director.

In my opinion, we did not consider the Black Hawk flights to be part of the OPC package. We mainly provided flight-following for them. We didn't spend too much time on the radio. We didn't get any response when we provided picture calls or anything like that to them. That is just a personal opinion. Also, the way it's broken out in the package, when you get the flow on a daily basis, it would show the helo all the way at the bottom almost as a separate entity. I do not have anything I wish to add to the matters we've covered. After thinking about it, if I'm not mistaken, I think we push the Eagle Flight from the enroute to the TAOR freq when they get to the jump point; but I'm not too sure about that. The jump point is a location just outside the TAOR.

I do not have anything else to add.

(The standard witness caution was given and the witness had no questions. The interview was concluded at 1918.)

I certify that the foregoing is a true and accurate summary of the testimony of **CAPTAIN RUBEN RIOS**, as given to the Aircraft Accident Investigation Board.



WILLIAM K. AT LEE, JR., Col, USAF
Legal Advisor

RIOS

**SUMMARIZED TESTIMONY
CAPTAIN ROBERT J. RYSAVY, II
966TH AWACS
TINKER AFB, OK**

The interview was conducted by Major Aaron D. Byas at Ramstein Air Base, Germany, beginning at 2005 hours, 21 June 1994. A witness advisement of rights was given in accordance with AFR 110-14, and the witness was sworn. This was a telephonic interview. The Board members were located at Ramstein AB, Germany. The witness was located at Tinker AFB, Oklahoma, and was identified by a judge advocate.

EXAMINATION

I am Captain Robert J. Rysavy, II. My organization is the 966th AWACS, Tinker AFB, OK. My current duty position is Instructor Weapons Director in the Training Squadron. I have been a Weapons Director since August 1991.

I have flown as part of an AWACS mission crew in Operation PROVIDE COMFORT (OPC). The first tour was from the first week of November until the first week of December 1991. I flew a second tour from the middle of November until almost Christmas of December in 1993. I have had the opportunity to perform the enroute control duties, the TAOR duties, and the tanker duties.

As far as the UH-60 Black Hawk helicopters, call sign Eagle Flight, mission in the northern no-fly zone of Iraq, I do not know the specifics of everything they do. I know that they have active flights that are in the northern part of the no-fly zone. We were normally briefed, in the Air Tasking Order, the approximate times they would be flying and what their squawks were supposed to be. Typically, the missions that they actually flew deviated from the times, and it was often difficult to discover where they were. Communications with them were occasionally difficult. As far as that was concerned, our role that I saw was that we basically gave them flight-follow information, just keeping an eye on them when they were present on our place.

As far as perceiving any change in the AWACS' responsibilities or procedures regarding Eagle Flight operations, the 1991 tour was so long ago that I can barely remember most of the stuff we did during that tour. I've been on multiple deployments at multiple locations overseas in the meantime. I don't remember if there is a vast difference between the two. I know there are minor differences, but I couldn't say for sure what any of those differences would be.

As far as in-theater in-briefings or other information I received about AWACS' responsibilities toward UH-60 helicopters, call sign Eagle Flight, on my last OPC tour, we were briefed that they were there doing United Nations operations and that we could expect to see them in the Air Tasking Order and we could expect to intermittently see them on our consoles and

RYSAVY

be able to talk to them intermittently on the UHF radio. My memory back to 1993, that's about all that I remember being briefed specifically about the Eagle Flights. As far as our responsibility to them, it was essentially the same responsibility as to all the other aircraft. If they were scheduled to be up at a certain time, to look for them, to attempt to find them. If we couldn't find them and we couldn't talk to them, it was accepted that they were on the ground at one of their United Nations locations out of contact with us. Other than that, it was the same responsibility as any of the other aircraft in the area. There was nothing special above and beyond that I remember being briefed for those aircraft in a standard mission over there.

I recall receiving a briefing from the OPC staff. I don't remember if that briefing included any information about helicopter operations. I remember the briefing because the OPC briefing was in an entirely separate facility in the commander's conference room. I basically remember being given a general overview of what was going on with the operation. There was some classified information discussed about the nature of events going on. That's really all I remember from that briefing.

As far as any UH-60 Black Hawk helicopters operating in the northern no-fly zone of Iraq prior to our calling on station, I don't think on the flights we had on this most recent trip that we received any notification that they were flying before we got on station. I do not remember coming on station and having the radar and the radios available to us and there being an Eagle Flight there already. I don't remember if that happened for sure. As far as going off station with helicopters operating in the TAOR, to the best of my knowledge, there was always a prerequisite that all the fixed wing that we were talking to be out of the TAOR before we went off station. I don't remember if the same applied to the UH-60's, because they were on a United Nations mission and not an enforcement of the no-fly zone mission. I guess the answer is that I do not remember us leaving with them still being out there. That may have been the case. If we had been talking to them at the time, I'm sure some call would have been made. I don't remember for sure if that happened on any of the flights that I was on.

As the helicopters were flying in the northern no-fly zone of Iraq, I think we kept them on the enroute frequency; but I am not certain of that. I was not aware of a requirement for all aircraft to change to a TAOR frequency because, in a global sense, you would not want to switch the tankers to that frequency. In trying to remember the briefings, it was that the TAOR frequency was for aircraft trying to enforce the no-fly zone in the area. I do not remember if there was a directive that all the aircraft would be on a TAOR frequency. If I had a UH-60 helicopter on our enroute frequency, I would not switch him over to a TAOR clear frequency because they were operating on a United Nations mission. To clarify what I'm saying by United Nations mission, if they're operating on some type of ground mission, versus a type of mission where I have fighters or ground attack aircraft under my control that I may need to give them information about a violation of that no-fly zone, unless that aircraft was in the vicinity of one the helicopters, which it would not have been, that helicopter would be on a frequency that would have a lot of info that was not useful to them. I probably would not push them to the TAOR frequency.

RYSVVY

I do not remember, specifically, if the helicopter's Mode I was the same as the fighters' Mode I when they were operating inside the TAOR. Standard procedure within the Air Force is that all aircraft should be on the same Mode I. I do not remember if that was the case with the Eagle flights. The way we train, all our requirements are to have everybody on the same Mode I. As far as it being part of our procedure to check all aircraft Mode I's as they operated in the northern no-fly zone, I'm not certain if we did that. Normally, the procedure that is done on the airplane is that the Mode I is loaded into the system so you can determine if an aircraft is squawking that Mode I. The squawks from the airplanes themselves can be intermittent. Our interrogation of those squawks can be intermittent as well. So, if it was loaded into the system, there is no guarantee that the aircraft that is squawking that Mode I, that we would know that for sure. I do not believe there is a procedure written to check specifically Mode I.

I am not certain if there was any requirement for aircraft operating in the TAOR to have the same Mode I. I cannot state with certainty that that was the case. If I determined that an aircraft was squawking an incorrect Mode I, the ability to tell them they were squawking an incorrect Mode I would probably be difficult. As far as what IFF checks that were done routinely on the UH-60 Black Hawk helicopters, call sign Eagles, if I remember right, we used a Mode II to identify them and Mode IV checks were done routinely on everyone. As far as Mode I checks being part of our procedure, it would depend on what the sensor setup of the aircraft was; but the termination of the Eagle Flights, the only way we could find them was from their Mode II, if we could find them at all, was to find their Mode II. There were times when we could not even see them on radar, but the Mode II would be evident.

If the helicopter was flying in the northern no-fly zone of Iraq and they entered mountainous terrain and we lost their IFF radar return, our normal procedure, if you're familiar with the airborne warning and control systems, the computer-generated symbology is associated with the radar and the IFF data, that symbology would be suspended or a weapons controller may have referred to it as "parked" in the last known position of the aircraft. If it was an extended period of time, normally that computer-generated symbology was then removed to another location, because if it is kept in one spot for too long, then alerts will become associated with it's being there. It can also drift, and the symbology will not stay suspended and can move and attach itself to another piece of radar data in which case an aircraft would incorrectly identify. The warnings can be transmitted through the data link to other players.

If that was left there for an extended period of time, the symbology could move. If radar data that is not that helicopter, flies past that symbology, the symbology can attach itself to that radar data. That is only if it was not suspended. If it was suspended, then that would not happen. However, my recollection is that the symbology was not left there for an extended period of time; i.e., if the helicopter was sitting on the ground for an hour, the symbology would not be left there because we could no longer accurately determine if that is where the helicopter is. If that's the case, then we still have the symbology there and we're still telling the people who are in the link that that is where it is when, in fact, we're not sure. At that point, normally the symbology was removed to a different location or was taken out of the system entirely. In that case, the search


RYSAVY

for the helicopter's Mode II would resume once again.

I don't have any further matters pertaining to the areas that we've discussed to cover. Hopefully, I've answered your questions to a helpful level.

(The standard witness caution was given and the witness had no questions. The interview was concluded at 2028.)

I certify that the foregoing is a true and accurate summary of the testimony of **CAPTAIN ROBERT J. RYSAVY**, as given to the Aircraft Accident Investigation Board.



WILLIAM K. AT LEE, JR, Col, USAF
Legal Advisor

RYSAVY

SUPPLEMENT

- 1. Witness Testimony**
- 2. Manning Description Received 18 June 94**
- 3. Manning Description Received 22 June 94**


**MEMO FOR RECORD
SUPPLEMENT #2**

- A. Memo For Record, 22 Jun 94
- B. Commander, Military Coordination Center Manning Description, 11 Apr 94

MEMO FOR RECORD

22 June 1994

I certify that on 22 June, 1994, the attached document was received from Capt Randy Curtis, executive officer to Colonel Roger Radcliff, HQ USAFE Deputy XP. The document is the manning description for the commander, Military Coordination Center. It is dated 11 April, 1994 and has an identifiable line of text from a fax machine at the bottom.


GREGORY O. FEAL
Capt, USAF

Atch 2A

MANNING DESCRIPTION
FOR
COMMANDER, MILITARY COORDINATION CENTER

ULN: CTFMCCF 001

Job Title: Commander, Military Coordination Center

Abbreviated Title: CMCC

Description: Commands a Joint Service, Combined Liaison Element forward deployed under hostile fire conditions at Zakhu, Iraq and Pirinclik, Turkey in support of Combined Task Force PROVIDE COMFORT. Exercises tactical control of a UH-60 Aviation Detachment at Diyarbakir, Turkey. Maintains direct communication with Iraqi military and government officials, Kurdish civil and military leaders, United Nations officials and non-government organizations in Northern Iraq. Provides daily reports on the security situation and humanitarian relief operations, deconflicts potential confrontational issues, investigates incidents, presents Coalition demarches, and coordinates CTF UN Participation Act relief operations.

Desired Background: Must be current in Middle East affairs; previous service in the Middle East and/or peacekeeping operations desirable; proficiency or familiarity in Arabic, is mandatory. DEA test level 1/1 in Arabic required; level 2/2 desired.

Branch of Service: Army

Desired AFSC/MOS: 02A 48G

Alternate AFSC/MOS: None

Grade Range: O-6


Security Clearance: Top Secret

Other Requirements: Current CPR and Self-Aid & Euddy Care Training. Weapons qualified on M-16 rifle, 9MM pistol, and M-60 machine gun.

Level of Supervision: 17 Officers (4 USA, 1 USAF, 9 TU, 1 FR, 2 BR); 13 Enlisted (7 USAF, 3 USA, 2 UK, 1 FR); 95 Local national staff

Validated by:

Date: APR 11 1994


JEFFREY S. PILKINGTON, Brig Gen, USAF
Commanding General

SUPPLEMENT

- 1. Witness Testimony**
- 2. Manning Description Received 18 June 94**
- 3. Manning Description Received 22 June 94**

1

2

3

S-54

MEMO FOR RECORD
SUPPLEMENT #3

- A. Memo For Record, 22 Jun 94
- B. Fax Cover Sheet, 21 Jun 94
- C. Commanding General Manning Description, 10 Feb 93
- D. Chief of Staff Manning Description, 11 Apr 94
- E. Commander, Military Coordination Center Manning Description, No Date
- F. C-1 Director Manning Description, 11 Apr 94
- G. Director, Intelligence Directorate, 11 Apr 94
- H. C-3 Director Manning Description, 11 Apr 94
- I. C-4 Director Manning Description, 11 Apr 94
- J. Directorate of Command, Control and Communications Manning Description, 11 Apr 94
- K. Joint Operations Center (JOC) Chief Manning Description, 25 Aug 93
- L. Joint Operations Intelligence Center Watch Officer Manning Description, 9 May 94
- M. Commander, Combined Forces Air Component Manning Description, 11 Apr 94
- N. CFAC Deputy Commander Manning Description, 27 Jan 93
- O. CFAC Deputy Commander for Operations Manning Description, 27 Jan 93
- P. CFAC Assistant Deputy Commander for Operations Manning Description, 27 Jan 93
- Q. JSOTF Directorate Manning Description, No Date

MEMO FOR RECORD

22 June 1994

This Memo covers information discussed in two telephone conversations and a facsimile received as a result of these conversations. On 21 June, 1994, I called the Operation Provide Comfort CTF/C-1, Lt Col Allen, with a request for job descriptions (that had been effective before 14 April 1994) of selected personnel in the CTF. I told him that the board had requested these documents during the investigation and had been told that they would be given to the board. I then told Lt Col Allen that the board never received these documents. I requested job descriptions on the following personnel: CTF/CC, CTF/CS, CTF/C1,C2,C3,C4,C5,C6, CFACC, CFAC/DO, CFAC/ADO, JSOTF/CC, JOC CHIEF, and MCC/CC. Lt Col Allen stated that at some point he had given all of the originals of these manning descriptions to the C3. He said that he had given the C3 the originals of these and that these documents are copies of what he gave the C-3. Although I am not certain, I believe he said he gave the originals to the C-3 while the accident board was at Incirlik Air Base. I received the following manning descriptions in response: CTF/CC, CTF/CS, CTF/C1/C2/C3/C4/C6, CFACC, CFAC/DO, CFAC/ADO, CMCC, JOC, JOC CHIEF, and JSOTF Directorate(half of page was cut off). All of these manning descriptions were signed and dated except for the MCC commander's manning description. I called Lt Col Allen again on 22 June 1994 and requested the signed and dated copy of the MCC commander's manning description. He said he would look in his files and then told me he did not have any other version or copy of the MCC commander's manning description.

I certify that the attached documents are the originals of the facsimile I received on 21 June 1994. There is a total of 16 pages including the cover sheet. They are identifiable by the fax information at the top of each page and also the relevant information on the cover sheet.


GREGORY O. TEAL
Capt, USAF

Atch 3A

COMBINED TASK FORCE

FAX: CTF/C1

Date: 06/21/94

Number of pages including cover sheet: 16

Accident Investigation Board

To: CAPT TEAL

Phone: _____

Fax phone: 480-9930

Operation Provide Comfort

From: LT COL ALLEN

Phone: 676-3406

Fax phone: 676-8110

REMARKS: Urgent For your review Reply ASAP Please comment

Attached are the Position Descriptions you requested.

- SIR: *AS Requested*
- CTF/CL
 - CTF/CS
 - CTF/C-1
 - CTF/C-2
 - CTF/C-3
 - JOC
 - JOC CHIEF
 - CTF/C4
 - CTF/C6
 - CFAC/CL
 - CFAC/REPORT
 - CFAC/DO
 - CFAC/AOD
 - CFAC/CL

CAPT Teal

**MANNING DESCRIPTION
FOR
COMMANDING GENERAL.**

ULN: CTFCG00,001

JOB TITLE: Commanding General, CTF Operation Provide Comfort

ABBREVIATED TITLE: Commanding General

DESCRIPTION: Commands a Combined Task Force (CTF) consisting of over 1,850 military personnel and 60 aircraft from four coalition nations (United States, United Kingdom, France, and Turkey). Forces are deployed to several locations throughout southeastern Turkey and Northern Iraq. Responsible for ensuring the peace and security of Northern Iraqi. Flying position.

DESIRED BACKGROUND: Fighter Pilot or Fighter WSO

BRANCH OF SERVICE: USAF

DESIRED AFSC: 0002

GRADE RANGE: 0-7 Required

SECURITY CLEARANCE: TS/SCI


OTHER REQUIREMENTS: None

LEVEL OF SUPERVISION: Coalition Staff, Commanders of Military Coordination Center (MCC), Combined Forces Air Component Commander (CFAAC), Joint Special Operations Task Force (JSOTF), UH-60 Helicopter Detachment, Officer of Foreign Disaster Relief (OFDA)

LEVEL OF COORDINATION: USEUCOM DCINC and Staff, JUSMAT, TGS, MFA, UN, Turkish, Commander, 39th Group

Validated by:

Date: 10 FEB 1993


KURT B. ANDERSON
Brig Gen, USAF
Commanding General

Atch 3C

**MANNING DESCRIPTION
FOR
CHIEF OF STAFF**

ULN: CTFCG00 002

Job Title: Deputy Commander and Chief of Staff, CTF Operation
Provide Comfort

Abbreviated Title: Chief of Staff

Description: Serves as the Deputy Commander and Chief of Staff to the Commanding General of a Combined Task Force (CTF) forward deployed in a hostile fire zone in Turkey and Iraq. Responsible for the staff coordination of a multi-service, multi-national, air and ground force charged with monitoring Iraqi compliance with United Nations mandates delivered as a result of Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm. Additionally, serves as the Army Forces Commander (ARFOR) of the Combined Task Force. As required, assumes command of the Military Coordination Center (MCC) deployed in Iraq for the purpose of direct coordination with Iraqi military and indigenous population. In the absence of the Commanding General (CG), assumes command of the Combined Task Force.

Desired Background:

Branch of Service: USA

Desired AFSC/MOS: 0002A

Grade Range: O-6

Security Clearance: TS/SCI


Other Requirements: None

Level of Supervision: Five Directors (3 Col, 2 LTC), JA, POLAD, Services Office, PAO, and Executive Officer

Level of Coordination: Coalition Colonels (UK, FR, TU)

Validated by:

Date: APR 11 1994


JEFFREY S. PILKINGTON, Brig Gen, USAF
Commanding General

S-3
Atch 3D

**MANNING DESCRIPTION FOR
COMMANDER, MILITARY COORDINATION CENTER**

ULN: CTFMCCF 001

Job Title: Commander, Military Coordination Center
Abbreviated Title: CMCC

Description: Commands a Joint Service, Combined Liaison Element forward deployed under hostile fire conditions at Zakhu, Iraq and Pirinlik, Turkey in support of Combined Task Force PROVIDE COMFORT. Commands UH-60 Aviation Detachment at Diyarbakir, Turkey. Maintains direct communication with Iraqi military and government officials, Kurdish civil and military leaders, United Nations officials and non-governmental organizations in Northern Iraq. Provides daily reports on the security situation and humanitarian relief operations, deconflicts potential confrontational issues, investigates incidents, presents Coalition demarches, and coordinates CTF UN Participation Act relief operations.

Desired Background: Must be current in Middle East affairs; Previous service in the Middle East and/or peacekeeping operations desirable; Proficiency or familiarity in Arabic, is mandatory. DLA test level 1/1 in Arabic required; level 2/2 desired.

Branch of Service: Army

Desired AFSC/MOS: 02A 48G

Alternate AFSC/MOS: None

Grade Range: O-6

Security Clearance: Top Secret

Other Requirements: Current CPR and Self Aid & Buddy Care Training. Weapons qualified on M-16 rifle, 9MM pistol, and M-60 machine gun.

Level of Supervision: 17 Officers (4 USA, 1 USAF, 9 TU, 1 FR, 2 BR); 13 Enlisted (7 USAF, 3 USA, 2 UK, 1 FR); 95 Local National Staff

Validated by:

Date:

JEFFREY S. PILIKINGTON
Brig Gen, USAF
Commanding General

Atch 3E

**MANNING DESCRIPTION
FOR
C-1 DIRECTOR**

ULN: CTFC100 001

Job Title: Chief, Personnel Directorate, HQ CTF, Operation PROVIDE COMFORT

Abbreviated Title: Director C-1

Description: One of five directors on coalition staff working for the Commanding General (CG), Combined Task Force, Operation PROVIDE COMFORT. Provides administrative oversight of all matters related to manpower, personnel management, special recognition programs, joint departmental awards and decorations, and DOD approved entitlements. Responsible for accountability of nearly 1800 joint and coalition forces personnel. Liaison between CTF staff, host installation military personnel flight, and deployed Personnel Support for Contingency Operations (PERSCO) Team on all personnel matters and augmentation issues. Staff interfaces daily with other US services and coalition forces assigned, attached, and augmenting the CTF staff.

Desired Background: Mission Support Squadron, MPF, and MAJCOM/SOA personnel experience is highly desirable.

Branch of Service: USAF

Desired AFSC: 036P4

Alternate AFSC: 036C4

Grade Range: O-5 required


Security Clearance: Secret

Other Requirements: None

Level of Supervision: One officer, 8 enlisted; including US Air Force and Army personnel.

Validated by:

Date: APR 11 1994


JEFFREY S. PILKINGTON, Brig Gen, USAF
Commanding General

Atch 3F

**MANNING DESCRIPTION
FOR
DIRECTOR, INTELLIGENCE DIRECTORATE**

ULN: CTFC200 001

Job Title: Director, Intelligence Directorate
Abbreviated Title: C2

Description: One of 5 directors on a coalition staff working for the Commanding General (CG) of Combined Task Force (CTF) Operation PROVIDE COMFORT. Directs a 24-hour intelligence collection, analysis, and reporting cell serving Turkish, British, and French, and United States commanders, staffs and combat aircrews. Manages the tactical air reconnaissance program, Cryptologic Support Group watch, and Air Force Information Warfare Center's electronic warfare efforts responding to CTF mission requirements. Supervises the multinational, multiservice staff which collects, analyzes, and reports intelligence information on Iraqi ground, air, and air defense force dispositions, activities, and capabilities. Accomplishes first-phase analysis and reporting on Iraq unconventional military activities. Acts as functional manager for intelligence assets of CTF/C2, CFAC, and squadron operations centers.

Desired Background: Duty as intelligence officer at numbered air force or higher level. Previous joint experience strongly desired.

Branch of Service: USAF

Desired AFSCs: 014N4

Grade Range: 06


Security Clearance: TS/SCI

Other Requirements: TDY enroute to HQ USEUCOM and USEUCOM Joint Analysis Center.

Level of Supervision: Supervises 15 officers (Turkish, US, British, French) and 18 NCOs.

Validated by:

Date: APR 11 1994


JEFFREY S. PILKINGTON, Brig Gen, USAF
Commanding General

MANNING DESCRIPTION
FOR
C3 DIRECTOR

ULN: CTFC300 001

Job Title: Director of Operations

Abbreviated Title: DIR C3

Description: One of five directors on coalition staff working for Commanding General (CG) of Provide Comfort. Directs staff which develops operational policies for the CG. Serves as primary staff liaison to the Combined Force Air Components Commander (CFACC). C3 functions 24 hours per day as the CTF focal point. Action officers routinely liaise with Turkish counterparts to enable flights by Provide Comfort aircraft. Non-flying position, but officer may routinely fly as an observer aboard CTF aircraft.

Desired Background: Fighter pilot or fighter WSO.

Branch of Service: USAF

Desired AFSC: 011F4Y

Alternate AFSCs:

Grade Range: 0-6 required


Security Clearance: TS/SCI

Other Requirements:

Level of Supervision: 11 officers, 11 enlisted; including US Army/ Navy/Air Force/Turkish/British and French personnel.

Validated by:

Date: APR 11 1994


JEFFREY S. PILKINGTON, Brig Gen, USAF
Commanding General

S-6
Atch 3H

**MANNING DESCRIPTION
FOR
C4 DIRECTOR**

ULN: CTFC400 001

Job Title: Chief, Logistics Directorate, HQ CTF Operation Provide Comfort

Abbreviated Title: C4 Director

Description: One of six directors on coalition staff working for the Commanding General of Provide Comfort. Directs staff responsible for Supply, Transportation, Contracting, Budget, Customs, Civil Engineering, 1300 person Tent City, Harvest Falcon, PRIME BEEF team, and Aircraft/Munitions Status. Overall coordinator with Office for Foreign Disaster Relief for validation, procurement, and delivery of humanitarian relief requirements for the residents of Northern Iraq (N Iraq). Supports all operations and maintenance requirements for two military coordination centers and a relief coordination center at geographically separated locations in Turkey and N Iraq. Coordinator on the TGS Authorization List, Beyanname, Customs, and all Retrograde or Expansion Plans.

Desired Background: Logistics, Contracting

Branch of Service: USAF

Desired AFSC: 20C0

Alternate AFSCs:

Grade Range: 0-6 required


Security Clearance: Top Secret

Other Requirements:

Level of Supervision: Supervises 6 officers and 13 enlisted.

Validated by:

Date: APR 11 1994


JEFFREY S. PILKINGTON, Brig Gen, USAF
Commanding General

Atch 3I

**MANNING DESCRIPTION
FOR
DIRECTORATE OF COMMAND, CONTROL, AND COMMUNICATIONS**

ULN: CTFC600 001

Job Title: Chief, Command, Control and Communications Directorate,
HQ CTF, Operation PROVIDE COMFORT

Abbreviated Title: Director C-6

Description: Directs a staff which develops and implements policies, plans for command, control, communications, automation, and communications security (COMSEC) for the CTF. Directs and monitors tactical, strategic and base communications. Provides supervision for teams, manning, and support with operational communications equipment in different locations. Provides maintenance support for U.S. single channel, COMSEC, and automated systems. Provides limited software support. Occasionally may act as a liaison for Turkish, British, and French counterparts.

Desired Background: Operational and supervisory background in tactical and strategic communications systems.

Branch of Service: USA

Desired AFSC/MOS: 25C

Alternate AFSC/MOS: USAF-4945

Grade Range: 0-5


Security Clearance: TS-SCI

Other Requirements: Officer should come from a USEUCOM staff.

Level of Supervision: Two officers/33 enlisted (USA and USAF)

Validated by:

Date: APR 11 1994


JEFFREY S. PILKINGTON, Brig Gen, USAF
Commanding General

Atch 3J

MANNING DESCRIPTION
FOR
JOINT OPERATIONS CENTER (JOC) CHIEF

ULN: CTFC300 008, 010

Job Title: JOC Chief

Abbreviated Title: JOC

Description: Officer heads up a team that acts as 24 hour focal point for CTF matters. Develops daily situation report for staff review and distribution to higher headquarters. Monitors flight operations and reports discrepancies and difficulties to the Operations Director. Non-flying position.

Desired Background: Aviation background mandatory.

Branch of Service: USAF

Desired AFSC(s): 11XX, 2255XX

Alternate AFSCs: 10XX, 11XX, 12XX, 13XX, 14XX, 15XX, 17XX, 19XX (with Command Post experience), 22XX

Grade Range: O-4, O-3 ~~(senior)~~ *etc.*

Security Clearance: Secret

Other Requirements:

Level of Supervision: 3 enlisted. (Senior ranking JOC chief also schedules/supervises the other members.)

Validated by:



Date: 25 AUG 93

A. K. SMITH
Colonel, USAF
Director of Operations

5.
Aich 3K

**MANNING DESCRIPTION
FOR
JOINT OPERATIONS INTELLIGENCE CENTER
WATCH OFFICER**

ULN: CTFC300 011, 023, 024

JOB TITLE: JOC CHIEF

DESCRIPTION: Operations officer responsible for the supervision of the 24 hour Joint Operations Intelligence Center during designated shift. During assigned shifts, supervises three USA and USAF personnel and coordinates the activities of the primary and special staff representatives of four nations in support of Operation Provide Comfort. Provides crisis action management as the focal point of information flow to and from higher headquarters and subordinate units. Supervises the preparation of the daily Operation Provide Comfort SITREP and the Military Coordination Center Zakho Iraq SITREP and distributes them to higher headquarters and agencies. Coordinates aircraft and operational changes to the daily flight schedule with the Turkish C-3. Ensures internal control systems meet standards. Coordinates operations with the C-2 Intel Watch Officer. Acts as special actions Officer for the C-3. Non-flying position.

Desired Background: Aviation/Operations background mandatory

Branch of Service: USAF/USA

Desired AFSC(s)/MOS: 11Fxx, 12Fxx / 11A/E, 12A/B, 15B

Alternate AFSC(s)/MOS: None / 13A, 21B, 18A

Grade Range: 04, or 03(senior)

Security Clearance: Secret

Other Requirements: Ten years time in service

Level of Supervision: Three enlisted personnel during shift

Validated by:

9 May 1994

James R O'Brien
JAMES R. O'BRIEN
Colonel, USAF
Director of Operations

Atch 3L

MANNING DESCRIPTION
FOR
COMMANDER, COMBINED FORCES AIR COMPONENT

ULN: CTFPC00 001

Job Title: Commander, Combined Forces Air Component, CTF,
Operation PROVIDE COMFORT

Abbreviated Title: CFACC

Description: Acts as the commander for multi-national, multi-service air forces assigned to CTF, Operation PROVIDE COMFORT. Takes tasking and guidance from CTF/CG and translates into course of action for Operations Group to execute.

Desired Background: Fighter Pilot with Joint Experience.

Branch of Service: USAF

Desired AFSC: 0066-10C0

Alternate AFSC: None

Grade Range: O-6 required


Security Clearance: TS/SCI

Other Requirements: Will normally be the commander of the 39 WG.

Level of Supervision: Supervises 39 WG and deployed, attached flying squadrons totalling nearly 4,000 personnel.

Validated by:

Date: APR 11 1994


JEFFREY S. PILKINGTON, Brig Gen, USAF
Commanding General

Arch 3m

MANNING DESCRIPTION
FOR
CFAC DEPUTY COMMANDER

ULN: CTFPCOO 002

JOB TITLE: Deputy Commander, Combined Forces Air Component, CTF PROVIDE COMFORT

ABBREVIATED TITLE: CFAC/CV

DESCRIPTION: Acts as the CFACC when the CFACC is not available due to TDY, illness, etc.

DESIRED BACKGROUND: Fighter Pilot with Joint Experience.

BRANCH OF SERVICE: USAF

DESIRED AFSC: 0066-10C0

ALTERNATE AFSC: NONE


GRADE RANGE: O-6 required

SECURITY CLEARANCE: TS/SCI

OTHER REQUIREMENTS: Will normally be the vice commander, 39 TACG.

LEVEL OF SUPERVISION: In the absence of the commander, supervises 39 TACG and deployed, attached flying squadrons totalling nearly 4,000 personnel.

Validated



CURTIS H. EMERY II, Colonel, USAF
Commander, Combined Forces Air Component

DATE: 27 Jan 93

5
Atch 3N

**MANNING DESCRIPTION
FOR
CFAC DEPUTY COMMANDER FOR OPERATIONS**

ULN: CTFFCOO Q03

JOB TITLE: Deputy Commander for Operations, Combined Forces Air Component,
CTF PROVIDE COMFORT

ABBREVIATED TITLE: CFAC/DO

DESCRIPTION: Takes tasking from the CFACC and executes with the multinational, multiservice air forces assigned. Responsible office for joint planning accomplished with the Naval forces assigned to COMSIXTHFLEET. Supervises the tactical employment of all air forces operating in the TAOR. Direct reporting point for all unit maintenance problems and status.

DESIRED BACKGROUND: Fighter Pilot with Joint Experience.

BRANCH OF SERVICE: USAF

DESIRED AFSC: 0036-1φcφ

ALTERNATE AFSC: NONE

GRADE RANGE: O-6 required


SECURITY CLEARANCE: TS/SCI

OTHER REQUIREMENTS: Will normally be the Commander, 39 Operations Group.

LEVEL OF SUPERVISION: Currently supervises 12 flying units from four countries with 1200 personnel assigned. Has permanent party assigned to the Operations Group numbering 120.

Validated.

DATE: 27 Jun 93


CURTIS H. EMERY II, Colonel, USAF
Commander, Combined Forces Air Component

5
Ateh 30

MANNING DESCRIPTION
FOR
CFAC ASSISTANT DEPUTY COMMANDER FOR OPERATIONS

ULN: CTFFCOO 004

JOB TITLE: Assistant Deputy Commander for Operations, Combined Forces Air Component, CTF PROVIDE COMFORT

ABBREVIATED TITLE: CFAC/ADO

DESCRIPTION: Acts as the CFAC/DO when the CFAC/DO is not available due to TDY, illness, etc.

DESIRED BACKGROUND: Fighter Pilot with Joint Experience.

BRANCH OF SERVICE: ~~USAF~~ NAVY^(?)

DESIRED AFSC: 1406F - 11F4Y

ALTERNATE AFSC: 1455, 2255 - 11F4, 12F4


GRADE RANGE: O-5 or O-6

SECURITY CLEARANCE: TS/SCI

OTHER REQUIREMENTS: Will normally be the Commander, 39 Operations Support Squadron.

LEVEL OF SUPERVISION: Squadron commander with 117 personnel assigned. In absence of CFAC/DO, assumes supervisory position for all of assigned personnel.

Validated,


CURTIS H. EMERY II, Colonel, USAF
Commander, Combined Forces Air Component

DATE: 27 Jan 93

Atch 3A

MANNING DESCRIPTION
FOR
JSOTF DIRECTORATE

Description: Commands the Joint Special Operations Task Force (JSOTF) which includes a Joint Headquarters Staff with administrative, intelligence, operations, logistics and communications functions and subordinate US Army, US Air Force component operational commands. Responsible for the planning and execution of all combat search and rescue, personnel recovery and other assigned missions. Responsible for the morale, health, and welfare of all members of JSOTF and for ensuring that the unit is properly trained and ready to execute all assigned missions. He is a member of the SAR/PR Executive Staff and is the principle advisor to the CTF Commander on all personnel recovery missions and Special

Alternate MOS (USA) (Designation) (MOS) (MOS)

Arch 30